The tag has no usage guidance.

learn more… | top users | synonyms

2
votes
0answers
30 views

First-price auction with discrete values

Exercise 4.5 in Vijay Krishna's Auction Theory: Suppose that bidder 1 always has value $X_1=2$, while bidder 2's value, $X_2$ is equally likely to be $0$ or $2$. Find equilibrium bidding ...
1
vote
0answers
26 views

Two-player first-price auction with resale

Exercise 2.5 in Vijay Krishna's Auction Theory (slightly modified): Consider a two-bidder first-price auction in which bidders’ values are distributed according to $F$. Let $\beta$ be the ...
6
votes
2answers
313 views

Are lotteries auctions?

I heard one professor of my university say that "lottery is a kind of auction. So we can predict it! Then we could get a lot of money!" Since he is in the mathematics department, and I know little ...
3
votes
1answer
75 views

System of Differential Equations- Asymmetric First-Price Auction

I am working on a problem in my Auction Theory textbook regarding a two-player asymmetric first price auction. Assume the bidders are risk neutral. The problem statement is as follows: ...
6
votes
1answer
47 views

Can't Derive Expectation in Second Price Auction

I'm working on a SPA where we solve: $\max_{\beta \ge 0} Pr\{Winning\}[v - \mathbb{E}(b^{[2]} \ | \ b^{[2]} \le \beta)]$ We assume all beliefs on bids are independently and identically distributed ...
3
votes
1answer
43 views

“Auction” versus “Bidding war”

Real estate sales sometimes occur at an official auction. But sometimes a seller who does not take their house to auction may find themselves entertaining multiple bids for the house. In this case, ...
4
votes
0answers
76 views

Can repeated bidding in an auction make each player's type common knowledge?

In Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz(2007), there's a hand-waving argument to justify their setting as a game of complete information: we assume that all values are common ...
3
votes
1answer
34 views

Is there an algorithm to find as many NE as possible in this generalized second price auction?

Suppose three advertisers, I, II, III are participating in an auction for three positions for online advertising, top, middle and bottom. Assume that click per second for a position is not affected ...
10
votes
3answers
135 views

Impact of auction systems that allow 'sniping'

I'm a bit perplexed that eBay has auctions that have a fixed time ending, and so winners are often determined by who can 'snipe' the auction, by putting in the winning bid at the last possible ...
3
votes
0answers
78 views

eBay economics - total revenue impact from expanding ecosystem by 1 seller

While I think my question is straight forward, I'm guessing the answer to it is anything but. Thanks in advance for any insight you may be able to offer, even if it's just a directional assist. ...
3
votes
3answers
93 views

Bidder Count Impact on Uniform Price Economics

Say we have an uniform price auction where 1 really rare stamp is for sale. Only 5 randomly selected stamp collectors are invited to bid and the stamp ends up selling for 1 million dollars. Now ...
5
votes
3answers
80 views

What are the benefits of a first price sealed bid auction?

All parties make a single bid. But do not disclose the bid to peers. The organizer chooses the maximum (or minimum) bid as the winner. What are benefits of such a system as opposed to normal auction ...
4
votes
1answer
119 views

Fantasy football

I have an idea for a fantasy football experiment looking at three different areas of the draft. These three areas are the position of each pick and how often and what value are trades. I have dug ...
3
votes
1answer
100 views

Reverse auction formula

I am studing a little bit of auction theory. I found the optimal bid value in the Milgrom paper for the first price auction that is $$ P=v \frac{n-1}{n} $$ where $P$ is the optimal bid, $v$ is the ...
1
vote
1answer
69 views

Intuition behind the linkage principle

An important result in auction theory is Milgrom & Weber's linkage principle, which, roughly, holds that the expected revenue from an auction is higher is the seller commits ex ante to reveal as ...