Say we have an uniform price auction where 1 really rare stamp is for sale. Only 5 randomly selected stamp collectors are invited to bid and the stamp ends up selling for 1 million dollars. Now ...
Starting on p. 98 of Salanie's "The Economic of Taxation" (2nd edition), it explains To probe it more rigorously, let us define the utility of taxpayer $w$ when he claims to have productivity ...
I am a fledgling computer science researcher working in intersection of economics and computation. Please excuse me if this question seems out of place to the administrator. I am currently studying ...
Can the tools of mechanism design be applied when the decision space $D$ depends on the types $\theta$? For example, when $d \in D$ represents the total funding allocated toward some good and ...
What is the definition of "First Best", "Second Best", etc. in contract theory? Especially, what is the difference between "First Best" in contract theory and "ex-post efficient" in mechanism design? ...
In mechanism design, the optimal mechanism is usually not linear in the agent's type. However, linear mechanisms are easy for implementation. Are there any studies on the performance comparison ...
The question of designing matching procedure (between high-schools and students, med intern and hospitals, kidney donors and receivers,...) has been widely studied by economists and vastly contributed ...