Skip to main content
Economics

Return to Question

Post Closed as "Not suitable for this site" by Giskard, luchonacho, Kitsune Cavalry♦, Herr K., EconJohn♦
added 5 characters in body
Source Link
hllspwn
hllspwn
  • 149
  • 4

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from thea finite space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it.

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from the space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it.

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from a finite space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it.

deleted 10 characters in body
Source Link
luchonacho
luchonacho
  • 8.6k
  • 5
  • 26
  • 55

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from the space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it. Thanks.

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from the space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it. Thanks.

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from the space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it.

Source Link
hllspwn
hllspwn
  • 149
  • 4

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Pure Strategies in Sequential Games

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from the space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My intuition says me "yes", because at node $t$ a player could take the strategies from $t+1$ as given, and order all the available options where at least one would be the best (may be not unique, of course). If what I say it is true, I would very grateful to know who makes the proof or where to find it. Thanks.