Timeline for Why is the tat-for-tat strategy a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
5 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| May 21, 2020 at 13:47 | comment | added | user28065 | @HerrK thanks for your comment. I left one above in response to 201p - do you have any thoughts on it? | |
| May 21, 2020 at 4:49 | history | edited | Art | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 99 characters in body
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| May 21, 2020 at 4:48 | comment | added | Art | @HerrK. Great point. I was focusing on the nature of the experiment (as in, why is tit-for-tat better than grim reaper) and forgot about the NE notion. | |
| May 21, 2020 at 4:31 | comment | added | Herr K. | I think OP implicitly assumes, as is common in the literature, that both players adopt the tit-for-tat strategy. In that case, the pair of tit-for-tat strategies can form a NE in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma when the players' discount factor is sufficiently large. | |
| May 21, 2020 at 3:16 | history | answered | Art | CC BY-SA 4.0 |