Timeline for NE equilibrium with lobbying of cournot producers
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
8 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 30, 2020 at 8:20 | comment | added | VARulle | I think it does. Not chronologically, but in the game tree. How else would you model perfect commitment in a game tree? | |
| May 29, 2020 at 13:23 | comment | added | Lin Jing | Yes, moving first definitely generates the commitment power, but commitment power does not necessarily have to be the case of moving first. | |
| May 29, 2020 at 11:33 | comment | added | VARulle | It's a NE if player $i$ can move first. But this is not the case in the given game, so it's not a NE of the given game. Your answer is not an answer to the question asked here. | |
| May 29, 2020 at 10:59 | comment | added | Lin Jing | It is an NE when player $i$ can commit/stick to $q_i^C$, and $q_j^C$ is player $j$'s best response. It is not an SPNE because $q_i^C$ is not the best response of $q_j^C$. | |
| May 29, 2020 at 10:49 | comment | added | Lin Jing | This is only an NE If player $i$ commits to the production level $q_i^C$ and won't change it in the second stage. If he cannot commit, in the second stage, $q_i^C$ is not a best response to $q_j^C$, so he will deviate, and then player $j$ will also deviate, until they reach the original SPNE. | |
| May 29, 2020 at 8:31 | comment | added | VARulle | What do you mean with "Therefore, $q^C_i$ and $q^C_j$ can only be an NE if player $i$ does have the commitment power."? The strategy profile is either a NE or not. | |
| May 28, 2020 at 1:17 | history | edited | Lin Jing | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
deleted 2 characters in body
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| May 28, 2020 at 1:10 | history | answered | Lin Jing | CC BY-SA 4.0 |