Timeline for What is 2nd round of rationalizability for a 1st price auction?
Current License: CC BY-SA 4.0
12 events
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| Sep 11, 2020 at 19:35 | comment | added | ask | Hi, I add some content, do you think that is enough for 2nd round of rationalizability? | |
| Sep 11, 2020 at 19:35 | history | edited | ask | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
add additional contents
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| Sep 10, 2020 at 13:18 | history | edited | Bayesian | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
to clarify
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| Sep 10, 2020 at 12:42 | history | edited | Bayesian |
edited tags
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| Sep 10, 2020 at 12:30 | answer | added | Bayesian | timeline score: 2 | |
| Sep 9, 2020 at 18:21 | history | edited | ask | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
added 76 characters in body
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| Sep 9, 2020 at 18:08 | comment | added | Michael Greinecker | Yes. You can also avoid the problem if you eliminate weakly dominated strategies. | |
| Sep 9, 2020 at 18:06 | comment | added | ask | I see in literature that some authors impose an additional condition like "bidders expect positive bids to win with positive probability". Will this condition solve the issue you mentioned? Probably I need to add this condition to my original post? | |
| Sep 9, 2020 at 17:47 | comment | added | Michael Greinecker | No. If the other bidder bids $1$ and you bid less, you will never have to pay anything- even if your bid is higher than your valuation. | |
| Sep 9, 2020 at 17:23 | comment | added | ask | But this is a 1st price auction. If one bidder bids higher than private value, there will be chances that he has to pay that price. So the highest he would bid is his private value. | |
| Sep 9, 2020 at 16:52 | comment | added | Michael Greinecker | Take any strategy of a player that always bids less than $1$. This strategy is a best response to the strategy of the other player of always bidding $1$. It will, therefore, not be eliminated in the first round, even if it bids higher than the actual value. | |
| Sep 9, 2020 at 15:27 | history | asked | ask | CC BY-SA 4.0 |