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Dec 19, 2015 at 18:15 comment added Giskard @möbius No, the allocation $x$ does not have to feasible for any coalition other than the grand coalitions. Only the other allocation with which coalition $S$ blocks $x$ has to be feasible for $S$. I am afraid there is no very simple way of putting it. Perhaps the best way you could phrase it is: $x$ is such that no coalition can Pareto-improve upon their share using only their own resources.
Dec 19, 2015 at 15:32 vote accept möbius
Dec 19, 2015 at 15:32 comment added möbius I see what you mean. So I needed to change "pareto efficient" in $F_{1}$ to "pareto efficient and feasible"?
Dec 18, 2015 at 19:21 history edited Giskard CC BY-SA 3.0
added 48 characters in body
Dec 18, 2015 at 19:11 history edited Giskard CC BY-SA 3.0
example
Dec 18, 2015 at 19:09 comment added Giskard @möbius I said that for allocation $x$ there is no Pareto-improvement that $A$ and $B$ can do. You said that allocation is $x$ is Pareto-efficient. The two are only the same if $A$ and $B$ can make allocation $x$ happen. I edited my answer to include an example of the difference.
Dec 18, 2015 at 18:46 comment added möbius First of all, thanks for your answer! However, I am not clear on the difference between the way you have defined $F_{1}$ and the way I have defined it as the pareto efficient outcome in a two person game between $A$ and $B$. It seems to me that the way you have defined $F_{1}$ is equivalent to "there does not exist a feasible allocation at least as good for $A$ and $B$, but strictly preferred by $A$ or $B$". Isn't this the definition of pareto efficiency? I am confused with this.
Dec 18, 2015 at 18:35 history answered Giskard CC BY-SA 3.0