If you aren't interested in learning from a game and decision theoretic perspective, I'm not exactly sure why you're posting on an economics forum. Because that's what learning really is, from an economics perspective. AI really breaks down into three subfields: logical, behavioral, and machine learning. The logical subfield deals with logical reasoning, automated proof-writing, automated conjecture making, and such. Behavioral AI is really more in line with theoretical economics- game theory, decision theory, mechanism design, etc.
Machine learning is really what constitutes mainstream AI research nowadays. This is really due to the fact that we now have the resources and tools to better deal with big data, rather than a philosophical revelation or technical breakthrough. Hot topics in computer science are very industry and money driven (as a theorist, I would argue too much so). Machine Learning really boils down to applying a stochastic process and refining a model. There isn't so much learning going on, just enhanced stupidity that works well sometimes. That's not to dismiss Machine Learning, but we should call it what it is.
I would definitely recommend AI, Machine Learning, and Evolutionary Game Theory, though. Russell and Norvig is the established classic AI text, and it has sections on Machine Learning as well. Link: http://aima.cs.berkeley.edu/
Evolutionary Game Theory uses similar techniques as Machine Learning. It relaxes the assumptions of Neoclassical Game Theory. Agents need not be perfectly rational. They can have imperfect information and adjust their strategies myopically. The game is played repeatedly. We then see how "mutation" (such as human error or experimentation) in enough agents drives changes in equilibrium. So we have a dynamical process to select equilibria in games. We can apply dynamics such as the imitation dynamic, the best response dynamic, etc. Weibull (https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/evolutionary-game-theory) and H. Peyton Young are both good introductions (https://www.amazon.com/Individual-Strategy-Social-Structure-Evolutionary/dp/0691086877/).
I took a seminar in Economics this past spring, the first half of which was Evolutionary Game Theory. We went through a bunch of papers as well; a subset of the following. One paper I enjoyed was Competitive Behavior in Market Games: Evidence and Theory. It showed that as the number of agents was made sufficiently large, that evolutionary forces drove the Nash equilibrium to the Walrasian equilibrium (under certain assumptions). This provides a behavioral motivation for the study of r-fold replica economies in the general equilibrium setting.
Mark E. Schaffer (1989): “Are Profit-Maximisers the Best Survivors?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12, 29-45.
Mark E. Schaffer (1988): “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies for a Finite Population and a Variable Contest Size,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 132, No. 4, 469-478.
Hehenkamp, B., W. Leininger, and A. Possajennikov (2004): “Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, 1045–1057.
Duffy, J., A. Matros, and T. Temzelides (2011): “Competitive Behavior in Market Games: Evidence and Theory,” Journal of Economic Theory 146, 1437-1463.
Kandori, M., G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1993): “Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games,” Econometrica, 61, 29-56.
P. Rhode, and M. Stegeman (1996): “A Comment on ‘Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games’,” Econometrica, 64, 443-449.
W. Sandholm (1998): “Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution,” Economics Letters, 61, 165-170.
Young, P. (1993): “The evolution of conventions,” Econometrica, 61, 57-84.
Young, P. (1993): “An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Theory 59, 145-168.
M. Saez-Marti and J. Weibull. (1999): “Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model,” Journal of Economic Theory 86, 268-279.
Matros, A. (2003): “Clever Agents in Adaptive Learning”, Journal of Economic Theory, 111, 110-124.
Ellison, G. (1993): “Learning, local interaction and coordination,” Econometrica, 61, 1047-1072.
Glenn Ellison (2000): “Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution,” Review of Economic Studies, 67 (1), 17-45.
Bergstrom, T. and Stark, O. “How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment.”
American Economic Review, May 1993 (Papers and Proceedings), 83(2), 149-55.
Eshel I., L. Samuelson and A. Shaked (1998): “Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model,” The American Economic Review 88(1), 157-179.
Matros, A. (2012): “Altruistic Versus Egoistic Behavior in a Public Good Game,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36, 642-656.
Robson, A., and F. Vega-Redondo (1996): “Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Random Matching,” Journal of Economic Theory, 70, 65-92.
Josephson, J., and A. Matros (2004): “Stochastic Imitation in Finite Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 49, Issue 2, 244-259.