# Kahneman and Tversky Decision experiments contradict Neumann-Morgensterns utility theory [duplicate]

I want to know the reason why Kahneman and Tversky Decision experiments contradict Neumann-Morgensterns utility theory.

Could anyone please ellaborate this to me? Thanks.

• You need to show some effort, we are not a homework-doing machine. Which experiments are you referring to? Have you at least read some Wikipedia articles on the topic before asking the question? – Oliv Mar 30 '17 at 10:41
• @Oliv Thanks. I agree with you. I appreciate your involvement in this conference. Actually I got the solution for this problem here "economics.stackexchange.com/questions/95/…" – UserAb Mar 30 '17 at 10:55

I will write out some generalized comments here because I am incredibly interested in the contributions of experimental economics to our understanding of economic man. Further, I am not convinced entirely that this is a homework question. The real thing here is that I think many other people - especially undergrads possibly interested in pursuing graduate school - might find the answer both interesting and compelling.

So, here is a brief outline of what could be a more complete answer:

Foremost, I recommend you think carefully about the axioms of expected utility theory. In particular, think about the independence axiom. As a reminder, the independence axiom is as follows:

Assuming that $X,Y,Z \in \mathbb{R}$ are lotteries and $p\in(0,1)$ is a generic probability:

$$X \succ Y, \implies pX + (1-p)Z \succ pY (1-p)Z$$