In his seminal paper Arrow (1962) states that information should be distributed without limit if an optimal allocation is to be achieved. Quote (p. 614-615):
The cost of transmitting a given body of information is frequently very low. If it were zero, then optimal allocation would obviously call for unlimited distribution of the information without cost. (...) The owner of the information should not extract the economic value which is there, if optimal allocation is to be achieved; but he is a monopolist, to some small extent and will seek to take advantage of this fact.
Quote (p. 616-617):
In the first place, any information obtained, say a new method of production, should, from the welfare point of view, be available free of charge (apart from the cost of transmitting information). This insures optimal utilization of the information but of course provides no incentive for investment in research. In an ideal socialist economy, the reward for invention would be completely separated from any charge to the users of the information. In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the information.
Arrow makes the point that creating a market for information is difficult given the peculiar nature of the commodity information. But if information did not have those special attributes: Couldn't information be "produced" by an organization and sold without welfare loss? Why do property rights lead to suboptimal allocation in the case of information?
Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. url: https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/2144.html