Consider a 2 player all-pay auction, bidding for $1.
Each submits a bid that is a real number, thus $S_i=[0,\infty)$. The player with a higher bid wins $1, but both players must pay the submitted bid.
Player $i$'s payoff function is:
$v_i(s_i,s_{j})=$
$-s_i$ if $s_i<s_{j}$
($\frac{1}{2}-s_i$) if $s_i=s_{j}$
($1-s_i$) if $s_i>s_j$.
Suppose player $j$ plays a mixed strategy in which she is uniformly choosing a bid between 0 and 1.
I am only interested in the expected payoff from player $i$'s bidding less than 1, because if $s_i$>1, he would win, but also incur a negative payoff.
My question:
Why is Pr$(s_i=s_j)$=0 for any $s_i\in[0,1]$ if player $j$'s mixed strategy is U[0,1]?
My confusion is: the PDF of player $j$ is 1 for any $s_j\in(0,1)$. So if I only consider $s_i<1$ and Pr$(s_i=s_j)$, how do I justify it becomes $0$?