Morton Davis in his book Game Theory: A non-Technical introduction brings the following example of a non-zero sum game (pg.73) :
A Buisness Partnership
A builder and an architect are jointly offered a contract to design and construct a building. They are offered a single lump sum as a payment and are given a week to decide whether they accept. The approval of both is required, so they must decide how the lump sum will be divided. The architect writes to the builder suggesting that the profits be divided equally. The builder replies, committing himself to the contract in writing provided he receives 60 percent of the profits. He informs the architect moreover, that he is going on a two week vacation, that he cannot be reached, and it is up to the architect to accept the contract on these terms or reject it entirely.
The architect feels like he is being exploited. He feels that his services are valuable as the builder's and that each should receive half the profits. On the other hand, the probable profit is large, and under different circumstances, he would consider 40 percent of such a total an acceptable fee. Should he accept the builder's offer? Note that the builder has no more options; on the architect has the choice- to accept or reject the contact. This is reflected in the payoff matrix shown:
$$\left[\begin{matrix}(0.40,0.60)\\(0, 0)\end{matrix} \right]$$
My question :
The way the case seems to be presented is that the architect is forced to choose 40 percent in light of the alternative where there is no profits to be gained. What about the architect's opportunity cost? Isn't there what to be gained from the architect when refusing this split of profits in a 40-60 split as far as opportunity cost in concerned?