Consumer's problem in default scenario:
\begin{eqnarray*} \max_{x_1, x_2} & \ \frac{x_2}{(1+x_1)^2} \\ \text{s.t.} & \ x_1 + x_2 \leq 10 \\& \ 0 \leq x_2 \leq x_1 \end{eqnarray*}
We can easily show that the solution will satisfy $x_2 = x_1$, and therefore we can rewrite the above problem as:
\begin{eqnarray*} \max_{x_1} & \ \frac{x_1}{(1+x_1)^2} \\ \text{s.t.} & \ 0 \leq x_1 \leq 5 \end{eqnarray*}
Solving this problem we get $x_1= 1$. Consequently, $x_2 = 1$ and the utility of the consumer in optimum is $\dfrac{1}{4}$.
Consumer's problem with a possibility of freely disposing good 1 after paying the fee:
\begin{eqnarray*} \max_{x_1, x_2} & \ x_2 \\ \text{s.t.} & \ x_1 + x_2 \leq m \\& \ 0 \leq x_2 \leq x_1 \end{eqnarray*}
where $m$ is the net income of the consumer after paying the lump-sum fee.
Solution to this problem is $\left(\dfrac{m}{2}, \dfrac{m}{2}\right)$, and the utility of the consumer in optimum is $\dfrac{m}{2}$. Comparing this with the default scenario yields that consumer is indifferent between the scheme and the default when $m = \frac{1}{2}$. Therefore, the maximum willingness to pay to dispose the good at $0$ price is $10 - \frac{1}{2} = 9.5$.