The main shortcoming of the first Basel Accord (Basel I) was that its capital requirements did not reflect the actual risk of the bank assets.
One way this nonsense influenced the asset choice of banks was: risk being equal, they chose to reduce the availability of credit to some categories of borrowers shifting towards other categories with lower capital charge, at the expense of more socially preferable investments.
Now, suppose a bank has to choose between granting a loan to Company A and another investment, B, both equally risky.
Suppose that, due to the regulation rules, the bank has to put aside 150\$ of capital if it grants the loan to A or 100\$ if it invests in B. Hence, it will invest in B.
The same reasoning is valid for all the A-like companies and B-like investments, therefore it creates a credit crunch towards the former.
According to https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/credit-crunch, credit crunch is defined as:
economic conditions that make financial organizations less willing to lend money, often causing serious economic problems
and this is bad for the regulator (which is the Central Bank or a similar State Agency).
Is this behavior by the bank (the agent) with respect to the regulator (the principal) a sort of moral hazard, taking into account that the actual riskiness of the companies is known by the bank but not by the regulator?