I'm looking for a package or a code (preferably in R) that finds the solution to the stable marriage problem with transferable utilities (Shapley and Shubik 1971). Specifically, I'm looking for one or more of the following:

  1. The stable allocation, given a matrix of the joint surplus
  2. The set of transfers that support this allocation
  3. Option to specify another matrix of acceptable matches

As far as I know, the package matchingMarkets in R find the solution to that problem only in the case of non-transferable utilities. Any ideas?


1 Answer 1


There's two implementations that should somewhat cover your needs, matchingR which does reduced-form algorithmic matching and matchingMarkets, which estimates estructural matching models with some baysean tools to correct for endogeneity.

The problem is you're looking for some very specific models which may require some tweaks on these implementations.

  • $\begingroup$ Thank you, Pedro! If I understand correctly, both packages solve the marriage problem with non-transferable utility (NTU). I look for the transferable utility case, which actually has a very different solution. $\endgroup$
    – Muly
    Apr 11, 2019 at 17:01
  • $\begingroup$ matchingMarkets might cover your needs if you write the model such that selection depends on the utility of other participants! If that doesn't work for whatever reason then you might need to dig in the source-code and tweak it until you get what you need. $\endgroup$ Apr 12, 2019 at 18:57

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