Suppose that there are two agents, 1 and 2, and two goods, honey (h) and lemon (l), and that the agents' preferences over these goods are defined by the following utility functions:
$$u^1(x_h^1, x_l^1)=x_h^1+x_l^1$$ $$u^2(x_h^2, x_l^2)=min[x_h^2, x_l^2]$$
Furthermore, suppose that the agents are assigned the following initial allocations, of the form (h,l):
$$w^1=(1/2, 1/2)$$ $$w^2=(3/2, 1/2$$
Given these utility functions and initial allocations, one could draw an edgeworth box and compute the set of pareto efficient outcomes. Doing so, one obtains the set: $$x:=(x^1_h,x^1_l,x^2_h,x^2_l)|x^2_h=x^2_l , x_h^2\in[1/2,1].$$
In the above set of Pareto outcomes, I am assuming that markets clear, which is why I don't specifically mention the consumption of agent 2 (it's defined by what agent 1 does not consume). To calculate this set, I simply drew the edgeworth box and used the fact that Pareto efficiency is the set of points on the contract curve between the initial two indifference curves given by the initial allocation.
My ultimate goal is to find the competitive equilibrium which I know belongs to the set of Pareto efficient consumption levels, but I don't know how to do this. I know that CE is the pair of allocations and prices that cause the allocations to solve each agents consumption problem, but I'm honestly pretty lost in all of the different equations and constraints.
Could someone help clarify exactly what needs to be done?