I have recently started studying mechanism design (after having taken a basic graduate micro course) through Borgers' 'Introduction to the theory of mechanism design'.

I was wondering if people are aware of any books/papers that explore how to actually construct real-world indirect mechanisms that implement the optimal allocations/transfer rules that are characterized throughout the text. So far I have not detected some methodology underlying going from drms to indirect mechanisms, just scattered examples. Am I missing something here?

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    $\begingroup$ There is no one-fits-all solution here. The "best" indirect mechanism always depends on the setting at hand. You often start looking for mechanisms in which the true type report is a weakly dominant strategy. For instance, a second-price auction with bid-subsidies and individual reserve prices. $\endgroup$ – Bayesian Sep 2 '19 at 19:08
  • $\begingroup$ Perhaps market design is what you're looking for? Al Roth's page is a good place to start. $\endgroup$ – Herr K. Sep 3 '19 at 17:46

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