7
$\begingroup$

I've been looking at expenditure systems and have been really interested in the behaviour of the demand system that underlies bliss points:

Consider the bliss point utility function of the following form:

$$U(x_1,x_2)=-(x_1-\delta_1)^2-(x_2-\delta_2)^2$$

for two dimensions the corresponding hicksian demands are:

$$x_1^c=\delta_1+\left[-\frac{\bar{U}}{1+(\frac{p_2}{p_1})^2}\right]^\frac{1}{2}$$ $$x_2^c=\delta_2+\left[-\frac{\bar{U}}{1+(\frac{p_1}{p_2})^2}\right]^\frac{1}{2}$$

where $\bar{U}\leq 0$.

It follows that the expenditure function is: $$e(p_1,p_2,\bar{U})=p_1\delta_1+p_1\left[-\frac{\bar{U}}{1+(\frac{p_2}{p_1})^2}\right]^\frac{1}{2}+p_2\delta_2+p_2\left[-\frac{\bar{U}}{1+(\frac{p_1}{p_2})^2}\right]^\frac{1}{2}$$

Obviously expenditure functions can be much larger. however I'm having a hard time for generating a expenditure function for a number of $n$ goods.

tldr What would the hicksian demands look like for the utility function: $$U(\mathbf{x})=-\sum_{i=1}^n(x_i-\delta_i)^2$$

$\endgroup$

4 Answers 4

2
$\begingroup$

EDIT: My answer has been modified almost entirely in response to the feedback in comments.

TL;DR: The 2 good case is quirky and does not yield to a neat solution. Amit has posted a more complete solution for such systems, I will simply highlight why the solution in the original post is incomplete.

Non-Graphical Argument

A consumer will never demand any bundle outside $\{(x,y)\in\mathbb{R^2_+} \mid x \leq \delta_1, y \leq \delta_2\} $. So it must be the case that $e(p_1, p_2, \bar U) \leq p_1\delta_1 + p_2\delta_2 $ - which is in contradiction the expenditure function stated above.

The 'correct' solution that the Lagrangian will give you (as discovered in the comments to this post) is

$(x^c, y^c) = \left(\delta_1 - \left[\dfrac{- \bar U}{1 + (\frac{p_2}{p_1})^2}\right]^\frac{1}{2}, \delta_2 - \left[\dfrac{- \bar U}{1 + (\frac{p_1}{p_2})^2}\right]^\frac{1}{2}\right)$

However, even this is not complete.

Graphical Argument

The below arguments can also be seen succinctly in this graph:

The $(x^c, y^c)$ stated above is the point at which the budget constraint is tangent to the indifference curve.

  1. Corner points are an issue: Here, $y^c < 0$. It isn't enough to set $y^c = 0$ and keep $x^c$ as is - you can see that in the graphic below, that would actually put you on a higher IC than you are targeting, even though there is a cheaper bundle available for the utility level that you are targeting. enter image description here

  1. Target utility has a lower bound at/below which all other possible solution bundles are inferior to $(0,0)$ - $(x^c, y^c) = (0,0)$ for such cases. enter image description here

Here is a system that tries to account for these, but you'll see that even this system fails..

I think this interactive demo covers all edge cases

$\endgroup$
10
  • $\begingroup$ This does not answer the question or point out any error. I looked at your desmos example. I like it but you need to remember that there are two solutions with the square root. See what I have edited here: desmos.com/calculator/spndtlroug $\endgroup$
    – EconJohn
    Commented Oct 29 at 14:41
  • $\begingroup$ The desmos graph strictly demonstrates the solution that you have claimed for the 2 good case in your original post. The "correct" demand graph that you have shared with me has the exact flaw that Amit has already pointed out - it doesn't account for extremes. See this, this and this to see the specific cases where your corrected solution fails as well. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 29 at 19:24
  • $\begingroup$ The answer also pretty clearly shows your error - the best available bundle costs $p_1 \delta_1 + p_2 \delta_2$. It is impossible to get a better bundle, by definition of bliss point. The expenditure function described in your original post is strictly higher than this for $\bar U < 0$. Using the other solution you have found, once you impose non-negativity constraints (again, I have already stated that the full answer would involve invoking the Kuhn-Tucker conditions), you will obtain the complete solution analytically. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 29 at 19:27
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ @EconJohn that is closer and neater, yes. The only issue that I can see with that is this. The demand generated by the above functions is putting us on a higher IC than we're targeting, while bundles with the targeted IC are feasible and cheaper (look at the intercepts of the green IC in this graph). This problem arises when the price ratio is not 1 $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 30 at 6:22
  • 1
    $\begingroup$ @EconJohn See this completed system. It is not neat, but it recreates Amit's answer interactively. Perhaps we can find a way to make this neater. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 30 at 6:23
4
$\begingroup$

Usually the change in variables $X=x-\delta$ allows to write $$ e(p,u) = \min_{x \geq 0}\{ p'x : U(x-\delta) \geq u \} = \max_{X \geq -\delta} \{ p'X : U(X) \geq u \} + p'\delta $$ and so $ e(p,u) = E(p,u) + p'\delta.$

$\endgroup$
2
  • 2
    $\begingroup$ minimize is what you mean right? not maximize. $\endgroup$ Commented Oct 26 at 18:13
  • $\begingroup$ @Jesper Hypel: yes indeed, thank you. The first occurrence of max should be replaced by a min, but not the second, while $p'x$ is non-negative, $p'X$ becomes non-positive. I updated the post. $\endgroup$
    – Bertrand
    Commented Oct 27 at 21:13
2
$\begingroup$

I think there is some mistake in your calculations for Hicksian Demand. Here is what I have got for the two-commodity case:

Given that $u:\mathbb{R}^2_+\rightarrow\mathbb{R}$ defined as $u(x_1,x_2)=-(x_1-\delta_1)^2-(x_2-\delta_2)^2$, expenditure minimisation problem is defined as follows: \begin{eqnarray*} \min_{(x_1,x_2)\in\mathbb{R}^2_+} & p_1x_1+p_2x_2 \\ \text{s.t. } & -(x_1-\delta_1)^2-(x_2-\delta_2)^2\geq \overline{u}\end{eqnarray*} where $p_1> 0, p_2> 0$, $\delta_1> 0$, $\delta_2>0$ and $\overline{u}\leq 0$ are given. [Please note that the above problem has no feasible solution for $\overline{u}> 0$.]

Solving the problem, we obtain the Hicksian demand as follows: \begin{eqnarray*} (x_1^h,x_2^h)(p_1,p_2,\overline{u})=\begin{cases} (\delta_1,\delta_2)&\text{if } \overline{u}=0 \\ (0,0) & \text{if } \overline{u} \leq -\delta_1^2-\delta_2^2 \\ \left(0,\delta_2-\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_1^2}\right) & \text{if } \dfrac{\delta_1}{\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_1^2}} \leq \dfrac{p_1}{p_2} \text{ and } -\delta_1^2-\delta_2^2 <\overline{u} \leq -\delta_1^2 \\ \left(\delta_1-\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_2^2},0\right) & \text{if } \dfrac{\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_2^2}}{\delta_2} \geq \dfrac{p_1}{p_2} \text{ and } -\delta_1^2-\delta_2^2 <\overline{u} \leq -\delta_2^2 \\ \left(\delta_1-\left(\dfrac{-\overline{u}p_1^2}{p_1^2+p_2^2}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}},\delta_2-\left(\dfrac{-\overline{u}p_2^2}{p_1^2+p_2^2}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}\right) & \text{ otherwise } \end{cases}\end{eqnarray*}

Consequently, expenditure function is $e:\mathbb{R}_{++}\times\mathbb{R}_{++}\times(\mathbb{R}_-\cup\{0\})\rightarrow\mathbb{R}_+$ is

\begin{eqnarray*} e(p_1,p_2,\overline{u})=\begin{cases} p_1\delta_1+p_2\delta_2 & \text{if } \overline{u}=0 \\ 0 & \text{if } \overline{u} \leq -\delta_1^2-\delta_2^2 \\ p_2\left(\delta_2-\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_1^2}\right) & \text{if } \dfrac{\delta_1}{\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_1^2}} \leq \dfrac{p_1}{p_2} \text{ and } -\delta_1^2-\delta_2^2 <\overline{u} \leq -\delta_1^2 \\ p_1\left(\delta_1-\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_2^2}\right) & \text{if } \dfrac{\sqrt{-\overline{u}-\delta_2^2}}{\delta_2} \geq \dfrac{p_1}{p_2} \text{ and } -\delta_1^2-\delta_2^2 <\overline{u} \leq -\delta_2^2 \\ p_1\left(\delta_1-\left(\dfrac{-\overline{u}p_1^2}{p_1^2+p_2^2}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}\right)+p_2\left(\delta_2-\left(\dfrac{-\overline{u}p_2^2}{p_1^2+p_2^2}\right)^{\frac{1}{2}}\right) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{eqnarray*}

Here is an example to illustrate different types of solutions to this problem. Here we consider $u(x_1,x_2)=-(x_1-2)^2-(x_2-1)^2$ and show the Hicksian demand in four different situations:

enter image description here

$\endgroup$
5
  • $\begingroup$ Thanks for your looking into this question. I did catch an error, but my work does not align with yours. I know this is a free website and you are likely busy, but if you can spell out your answer a bit more in terms of derivations I would appreciate it. $\endgroup$
    – EconJohn
    Commented Oct 27 at 0:39
  • $\begingroup$ Thanks for the comment. I'll try and add more details today. Actually, there are possibilities of corner solutions, solution at the bliss point, solution at (0,0) and other kinds of solutions depending on the parameter values, prices and the target utility in this problem. $\endgroup$
    – Amit
    Commented Oct 27 at 4:42
  • $\begingroup$ @EconJohn I have added the graph to give an idea about different kinds of solutions. I hope that helps. $\endgroup$
    – Amit
    Commented Oct 27 at 9:17
  • $\begingroup$ While I appreciate the included visual, I wanted to see your math for your derivations as this answer is unintuitive for a fairly standard problem. $\endgroup$
    – EconJohn
    Commented Oct 27 at 20:01
  • $\begingroup$ I have just done standard slope comparisons at the solutions on the axis and in the interior to write the Hicksian demand. That is why I just posted the graph to illustrate different types of solutions. $\endgroup$
    – Amit
    Commented Oct 28 at 7:15
1
$\begingroup$

Edit: My previous answer contained a mistake for the case where $x$ is restricted to $\mathbb{R}_{+}^{n}$. I removed this case from my answer.

Take $\bar{U} > 0$. Let's denote $\delta = (\delta_{1}, \ldots, \delta_{n})$ and $p = (p_{1}, \ldots, p_{n})$. Assume $p \neq 0$. We want to solve \begin{align*} \min_{x\in\mathbb{R}^{n}} p \cdot x \qquad \text{s.t.}\quad - (x - \delta) \cdot (x - \delta) \geq - \bar{U}. \end{align*}

Let's first note that a solution must satisfy $(x - \delta) \cdot (x - \delta) = \bar{U}$. This is because the left side of the constraint is continuous in $x$, and because every neighbourhood of $x$ in $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ contains a point $x^{\prime}$ such that $p\cdot x^{\prime} < p \cdot x$ (since $p \neq 0$).

Setting up a Lagrangian, we solve \begin{align*} \min_{x\in\mathbb{R}^{n}, \lambda\in\mathbb{R}} p \cdot x + \lambda\left( (x - \delta) \cdot (x - \delta) - \bar{U} \right). \end{align*} The first order conditions are $$ p + 2 \lambda (x - \delta) = (0, \ldots, 0) $$ and $$ (x - \delta) \cdot (x - \delta) - \bar{U} = 0. $$ Note that $\lambda$ cannot equal zero as otherwise the first FOC is contradicted. The first FOC is therefore equivalent to $(x - \delta) = - p / (2\lambda)$. Plugging this expression for $(x - \delta)$ into the second FOC, $$ \frac{p \cdot p}{4 \lambda^{2}} = \bar{U} $$ and hence $\lambda = \sqrt{\frac{p\cdot p}{4 \bar{U}}}$. Finally, $$ x = \delta + p \frac{1}{2\delta} = \delta + p \sqrt{\frac{\bar{U}}{p\cdot p}} $$

To gain a geometric intuition, let's denote by $\Vert\cdot\Vert$ the Eucliden norm on $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ and observe that the set of feasible choices is $$ \left\lbrace x \in\mathbb{R}^{n}\colon \Vert\delta - x \Vert \leq \sqrt{\bar{U}}\right\rbrace. $$ This is nothing but the closed ball of radiuc $\sqrt{\bar{U}}$ around $\delta$. Minimizing the linear function $x\mapsto p \cdot x$ involves finding the point on the boundary of the ball where a level set of $x\mapsto p \cdot x$ is tangent to the ball. We find this point by traveling from the ball's center at $\delta$ in the direction of $-p$, i.e. orthogonal to the hyperplane, until we reach the boundary.

Here's an alternate proof that doesn't use any stuff involving Lagrangians: As before, we may restrict attention to points $y$ satisfying $\Vert\delta - y \Vert = \sqrt{\bar{U}}$. Any such point may be written as $y = \delta - (\delta - y)\frac{\sqrt{\bar{U}}}{\Vert \delta - y \Vert}$. Consider the point $x = \delta - p \frac{\sqrt{\bar{U}}}{\Vert p \Vert}$. We claim that $p\cdot x \leq p \cdot y$ for any such point $y$ on the boundary. This is the case if and only if \begin{align*} p\cdot (\delta - y) \frac{1}{\Vert \delta - y \Vert} \leq p\cdot p \frac{1}{\Vert p \Vert}. \end{align*} The right side equals $\Vert p \Vert$. As for the left side, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, \begin{align*} p\cdot (\delta - y) \frac{1}{\Vert \delta - y \Vert} \leq \Vert p \Vert \Vert \delta - y \Vert \frac{1}{\Vert \delta - y \Vert} = \Vert p\Vert, \end{align*} and so we're done. Moreover, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality holds strictly unless $y - \delta$ is a multiple of $p$. In that case, however, either $p = \delta - y$ or $y$ does not lie on the boundary. So the point $x$ is in fact the unique minimizer.

$\endgroup$
2
  • $\begingroup$ Hi, looks like you're on to something. but it seems that you made a mistake.your solved FOC should be $(x-\delta)=-\frac{p}{2\lambda}$. $\endgroup$
    – EconJohn
    Commented Nov 13, 2019 at 20:44
  • $\begingroup$ You're right, that sign is wrong, but the rest of the argument is unchanged. I'll edit the answer $\endgroup$ Commented Nov 13, 2019 at 21:02

Your Answer

By clicking “Post Your Answer”, you agree to our terms of service and acknowledge you have read our privacy policy.

Not the answer you're looking for? Browse other questions tagged or ask your own question.