I am interested in finding the literature or at least some references (books, journal papers etc.) for the following problem:

Suppose there is an auction with one seller and one buyer. The seller has two distinct and indivisible goods to sell and the buyer wants to buy at most one good.

Also, has the community of mechanism design dealt with this problem?

The reason I'm asking is because I want to design an auction for an engineering problem. But first I need to understand the theory behind auctions.

I'd appreciate any help. Thank you.

  • $\begingroup$ In what sense is this an auction if there is only one buyer? $\endgroup$ – BKay Jan 24 at 14:28
  • $\begingroup$ @BKay I might have used the terminology loosely. I was reading Borgers book "An Introduction to The Theory of Mechanism Design," Chapter 2, and I got the impression that examples of screening theory are like auctions. $\endgroup$ – johnny09 Jan 24 at 20:29

I think this would be a good starting point. Auction Theory - Jonathan Levin Stanford

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