I have been compiling some figures to compare China's macro conditions in 2003 and 2019. Clearly, much has changed in nearly twenty years. In particular, a few indicators really stand out. For instance the fact that the service sector has grown significantly during this time period and could entail a more painful recovery as quarantines stunt commerce. I can follow this logic with little issue.
However, in the headline coverage I often see the comparison made on GDP figures and how China in 2019 is seven times larger than it was in 2003 (roughly 2 trillion dollars and 14.2 trillion dollars). Most of the commentary centers around this will create a bigger shock to the rest of the world because China holds a larger proportion of GDP and expansion. What I have not seen addressed yet is what changes from China's point of view if GDP is seven times bigger.
If China's GDP is much bigger than it was in 2003, then ceteris paribus, what headwinds/tailwinds does that imply for China?
Feel free to answer from either market or regulatory standpoint.
I want to know what is likely to become more focal as a function of GDP size.
I tried a thought experiment where: as GDP increases, recovery is more challenging because of something akin to complexity theory. With a bigger and more vibrant economy, there are also new points of attack and thus more challenging. However this is merely postulation and not based on anything empirical.
Granted China's current GDP levels have a troubling connection with NPLs, but that doesn't mean one can't have a big GDP number without alarming levels of NPLs. So I'd say unless absolutely necessary, let's designate NPLs as out of scope for this question and focus on the size of the GDP alone. Surely it's not as simple as the bigger it is the harder it falls?