Over the past year, the notion yield curve control has resurfaced and appeared on FOMC minutes, decades after its last implementation.
According to the Fed's introduction page:
As the U.S. continued to incur debt, the Fed was obligated to keep buying securities to maintain the targeted rates—forfeiting some control of its balance sheet and the money stock. The public generally preferred to hold higher-yielding, longer-term bonds. Consequently, the Fed purchased a large amount of short-term bills, which also increased the money supply, to maintain the low interest rate peg.
After the war ended, FOMC members grew more concerned with addressing the rapid inflation that materialized. However, President Harry S. Truman and his treasury secretary still favored a policy that maintained YCC (which also protected the value of wartime bonds by implying a price floor). By 1947, inflation was over 17%, as measured by the year-over-year percent change in the consumer price index (CPI), so the Fed ended the peg on short-term rates in an attempt to combat developing inflationary pressures.)
This poses an interesting dilemma in configuring the bounds of the program. WW2 was a one-sided victory with rather clear end date. Yet the fact that YCC continued post-WW2 suggests that terminating the program was difficult. It's conceivable that marshaling the political will to end a program that the treasury likely derives massive utility for operating against a high fiscal-deficit backdrop was a major challenge. This phenomenon is sometimes termed "fiscal dominance."
A BIS paper goes into great length on the matter. Condensing one of the themes:
For many, a long period of large fiscal deficits and very high public debt-to-GDP ratios raises the spectre of fiscal dominance. It will in any case accentuate the links between fiscal policy, monetary policy and government debt management.