Let $F(p)$ denote the distribution of prices in a market, $\pi(p, F)$ are profits choosing $p$ given distribution $F$. $E\pi(p,F)$ is defined to be
$$ E \pi(p, F) = R(p) \psi(p, F)$$
where $R(p) = p D(p)$ is the revenue per customer, and $\psi(p, F)$ denotes the expected share of customers that a seller with price $p$, given distribution $F$ will face.
Definition (2.1) in Stahl (1996) (just below eq. 2.3) defines the symmetric Nash equilibrium as:
$$ E \pi(p,F) \leq \max_p p E \pi(p, F) \, \forall p$$
My question is why $(2.1)$ is defined as such? I would have thought that a Nash equilibrium requires choice being optimal, hence no incentive to change profits:
$$ E \pi(p,F) \leq \max_p E \pi(p,F) \, \forall p$$