Consider Modigliani & Miller Proposition II with corporate taxes. The cost of equity is $$ R_E=R_U+(R_U-R_D)\cdot \frac{D}{E}\cdot (1-T_C) \tag{1} $$ where $R_E$ is the cost of equity, $R_U$ is the cost of capital a firm would have if it had no debt (unlevered cost of capital), $R_D$ is the cost of debt, $D$ is debt, $E$ is equity and $T_C$ is the corporate tax rate.
$R_U$ has to be equal to return on assets, $R_A=R_U$. Otherwise (if $R_A<R_U$), the shareholders would not be willing to hold the shares.
Now by equation $(1)$, $R_E$ falls as $T_C$ increases. If $T_C$ is incredibly high, say close to 100%, we get $R_E\approx R_U$. So the shareholders are getting close to nothing, as the government takes almost everything what is left after the bondholders have taken their share of EBIT. Yet the shareholders' required return $R_E$ is lower than in the case of no tax where the shareholders reap all the profit after the bondholders have taken their share of EBIT. I find that counterintuitive. Could anyone help me clarify why this is (or is not) so?