Why is Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility treated as such a ubiquitous virtue? In this lecture, the answer given from the perspective of a non-principal player is, "it's easy to play; you have an obvious strategy."
For most games that would be referred to as games in the colloquially sense, I would argue that strategic richness, the opposite of being strategyproof, is what imbues a game with enduring entertainment value over a long period of time. Strategyproofing in these games tends to be desirable when some extrinsic consideration, such as satisfying paying spectators, overrides the interests of the players, or when short term interests of players are prioritized over their long term interests. Even in other types of games such as auctions or road selection while driving, it seems plausible that strategic richness may be seen as a virtue, perhaps depending on the individual player's tastes and personality.
I do see how this simplicity could be directly beneficial to the principal. Whether it is ultimately beneficial to the principal may depend on how much the principal cares about the interests of the other players, i.e., through market incentives, whether the principal is able to convince the other players that their interests align with the principal's interests, i.e., by manufacturing or encouraging a negative sentiment toward design decision which produce strategic richness, whether the principal can hide strategic simplicity behind the appearance of strategic richness, etc. The point is that strategyproofing could be positive or negative depending on the game, but it is championed in mechanism design seemingly beyond what is warranted.
I am new to studying the subject, so perhaps I have a very blinkered view of the field. Are there tools available for maximizing strategic richness in contrast to those for strategyproofing? If not, is it because there is some theorem that strategically rich games are necessarily less efficient, i.e., do they all suffer from Braess's Paradox?