There could be a problem with the definition of suffering... I would like to think of suffering as disutility (or decrease in utility) and I will follow on this definition. However, there might be a different conceptualization of suffering (50 shades of gray, where suffering actually increases utility etc.).
What concerns your question, if I want to maximize someone's suffering (disutility), thus minimize their utility, I need to know what their utility is. So let's start from it.
Consider the following scenario:
Consumer B has some utility function $U_B(\boldsymbol{x_a}, \boldsymbol{x_b})$, where $\boldsymbol{x_a}$ denotes actions of consumer A, while $\boldsymbol{x_b}$ denotes actions of consumer B himself. Consumer A wants B to suffer (therefore to have the least utility possible).
Minimizing something is the same as maximizing the opposite value. Therefore, we could say that
$$U_A(\boldsymbol{x_a}) = -U_B(\boldsymbol{x_a}, \boldsymbol{x_b})$$
Now the question remains, what do we know about the $\boldsymbol{x_b}$. Do we know they "play" sequentially and who starts? Do they play simultaneously etc... If B starts then the problem is reduced to searching $\boldsymbol{x_a}$ such that the utility is minimized, which would be the basic optimization problem. If A starts then he should know the reaction function of B. However, it would still be regular optimization problem.
Regarding your question, preferences of A are rational because we can describe them by utility function.