# Proving existence of a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in two-person continuous games

I am working on a game theory exercise and I want to prove existence and uniqueness of pure strategy NE for a 2 person game with continuous strategy spaces. Lets call the payoff functions $$\pi_1$$ and $$\pi_2$$ for players 1 and 2. The strategy spaces are simple one dimensional intervals in Euclidean space that are common across players ($$s_1,s_2 \in S = [a,b]$$). What do I need to do to show that the payoff functions are diagonally strictly concave? I am having a hard time wrapping my head around Rosen's paper and I don't need many dimensional strategy spaces and n players for now. I was wondering if there was a simpler, easy to understand version of the result for my simplified game. If someone could also provide some intuition for that condition, it would also be a massive help! Thanks

$$2s^2_1 \frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial s_1^2} + 2s_1s_2 (\frac{\partial^2 \pi_1}{\partial s_1 \partial s_2} + \frac{\partial^2 \pi_2}{\partial s_2 \partial s_1}) + 2s^2_2 \frac{\partial^2 \pi_2}{\partial s_2^2} < 0 \hspace{2mm} \forall [s_1 \hspace{2mm} s_2]^T \neq 0$$