Questions tagged [auctions]

Procedures in which participants submit bids, with resources being allocated among bidders in accordance with some pre-specified rule.

Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
10
votes
3answers
692 views

Impact of auction systems that allow 'sniping'

I'm a bit perplexed that eBay has auctions that have a fixed time ending, and so winners are often determined by who can 'snipe' the auction, by putting in the winning bid at the last possible ...
9
votes
1answer
265 views

eBay economics - total revenue impact from expanding ecosystem by 1 seller

While I think my question is straight forward, I'm guessing the answer to it is anything but. Thanks in advance for any insight you may be able to offer, even if it's just a directional assist. Here'...
8
votes
4answers
2k views

What are the benefits of a first price sealed bid auction?

All parties make a single bid. But do not disclose the bid to peers. The organizer chooses the maximum (or minimum) bid as the winner. What are benefits of such a system as opposed to normal auction ...
8
votes
2answers
299 views

How to auction shared item with a roommate?

My roommate and I split the cost of a game console a year ago (~$400) but he is now moving out. We were wondering how to fairly auction the console given the situation: We both paid an equal price ...
7
votes
2answers
431 views

Optimal Random Bids

This question comes from this website that I peruse often. Two players go on a hot new game show called “Higher Number Wins.” The two go into separate booths, and each presses a button, and a ...
7
votes
2answers
399 views

Are lotteries auctions?

I heard one professor of my university say that "lottery is a kind of auction. So we can predict it! Then we could get a lot of money!" Since he is in the mathematics department, and I know little ...
7
votes
2answers
136 views

Can't Derive Expectation in Second Price Auction

I'm working on a SPA where we solve: $\max_{\beta \ge 0} Pr\{Winning\}[v - \mathbb{E}(b^{[2]} \ | \ b^{[2]} \le \beta)]$ We assume all beliefs on bids are independently and identically distributed ...
6
votes
2answers
790 views

What is virtual valuation?

I’m reading through a textbook in auction design when it describes a term, virtual valuation $$\phi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F(v_i)}{f(v_i)}$$ where $f$ is the pdf of a bidders valuation and $F$ is ...
6
votes
1answer
293 views

What is the point of silent auctions?

A while back, someone decided to auction off something unique and valuable, as a silent auction: everyone would submit one bid only, and whoever bid the highest would win. I submitted a bid that I ...
6
votes
1answer
477 views

Bayes-Nash equilibrium in Auction

Consider a seller offering a single object for sale to two buyers with independent valuations – each bidder’s value is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Assume that buyer 1 submits a bid that buyer ...
6
votes
1answer
111 views

Auction models for tickets

Consider a typical event for which tickets are sold. The event only occurs once, and for simplicity we can assume that only one kind of ticket is provided, i.e, no VIP seats etc. $N$ tickets are ...
6
votes
2answers
1k views

In auction theory, why is my own valuation a random variable?

Auction theory typically (always?) begins by assuming that each bidder's valuation is a random variable. Now, it might seem reasonable (at least from a Bayesian perspective) for you to treat other ...
6
votes
1answer
433 views

Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a first-price auction

In a famous textbook example of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, there is a first-price auction with two independent players. Each player $i$ values the item as $v_i$, which is distributed uniformly in $[...
6
votes
2answers
49 views

Auction theory reference request

I am interested in finding the literature or at least some references (books, journal papers etc.) for the following problem: Suppose there is an auction with one seller and one buyer. The seller ...
6
votes
1answer
233 views

Arguing uniqueness of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in an auction setting

In an auction setting with interdependent values, let $\theta_i$ denote the type of player $i$ and $m_i$ that player's message (a bid, essentially). I have calculated the best response function as: $$...
6
votes
1answer
333 views

System of Differential Equations- Asymmetric First-Price Auction

I am working on a problem in my Auction Theory textbook regarding a two-player asymmetric first price auction. Assume the bidders are risk neutral. The problem statement is as follows: Suppose ...
5
votes
3answers
259 views

Multi-item Auctions in Mechanism Design

I'm new to auction theory and only started reading it a few days ago. My question is this: Is it possible to design efficient auctions of multiple non-identical items? By efficient I mean maximize the ...
5
votes
1answer
871 views

How are ties broken in a second price sealed bid auction?

Say there are two people who evaluate an object at 5 dollars and a third who evaluates it at 4 dollars playing a second price sealed bid auction. The first two bid 5 dollars and the third bids 4 ...
5
votes
1answer
572 views

Reverse Auction bidding strategy

A buyer wants to buy contiguous land plots from three landowners (sellers) who own fixed size plots. Sellers have their private valuation of their plots. The buyer will hold a closed bid procurement ...
5
votes
1answer
213 views

What types of 'market mechanisms' are said to exist besides auctions?

The book Understanding Auctions states: The term auction covers a wide range of market mechanisms that are used to exchange products and services by determining who receives an item and how much is ...
5
votes
1answer
6k views

What are the advantages and disadvantages of second price auctions?

I am reading https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction about second price auctions. It seems counterintuitive to me that the winning bidder pays the bidding price of the runner-up bidder, rather ...
5
votes
1answer
247 views

Fantasy football

I have an idea for a fantasy football experiment looking at three different areas of the draft. These three areas are the position of each pick and how often and what value are trades. I have dug ...
5
votes
2answers
150 views

Bayesian Mechanism vs Prior-free Mechanism

I have a double auction mechanism in which the valuations of the agents for the items are drawn from a known random distribution. To be precise, the valuations are the probability of each agent ...
5
votes
2answers
322 views

Two-player first-price auction with resale

Exercise 2.5 in Vijay Krishna's Auction Theory (slightly modified): Consider a two-bidder first-price auction in which bidders’ values are distributed according to $F$. Let $\beta$ be the ...
5
votes
0answers
87 views

Auction mechanism with no trusted third-party

I have been using a double-auction mechanism to solve a two-sided market where multiple agents are competing to supply/use slices of a shared resource. The owner of the resource is a trustable third-...
5
votes
0answers
97 views

Can repeated bidding in an auction make each player's type common knowledge?

In Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz(2007), there's a hand-waving argument to justify their setting as a game of complete information: we assume that all values are common ...
4
votes
1answer
368 views

Ex-post vs Ex-ante Budget Balance in Auctions

Have I understood this correctly? When I say my auction mechanism is ex-post budget balanced it means that in practice (I have done market simulations) and according to the results my mechanism is ...
4
votes
1answer
178 views

Auctions with affiliation

This problem is an example given in Vijay Krishna's Auction Theory (2nd Edition, Chapter-6, Example 6.2). The problem is as follows: Suppose $S_1,S_2$, and $T $ are uniformly and independently ...
4
votes
1answer
267 views

“Auction” versus “Bidding war”

Real estate sales sometimes occur at an official auction. But sometimes a seller who does not take their house to auction may find themselves entertaining multiple bids for the house. In this case, ...
4
votes
1answer
87 views

Are there multiple equilibria in the second price auction?

Suppose that $n\geq 2$ bidders compete in a second price auction. Each bidder $i$ knows their own valuation $v_i$, but only knows the distribution generating the valuations of the other players. ...
4
votes
1answer
2k views

Difference between double auction and continuous double auction?

What is the difference between double auction and continuous double auction? Sometimes I feel that they were types of two-sided auction but sometimes I feel as if they were two separate concepts.
4
votes
2answers
1k views

First-price auction with discrete values

Exercise 4.5 in Vijay Krishna's Auction Theory: Suppose that bidder 1 always has value $X_1=2$, while bidder 2's value, $X_2$ is equally likely to be $0$ or $2$. Find equilibrium bidding strategies ...
4
votes
1answer
32 views

Incentive compatibilty conditions for multi-item auctions

In this paper by Myerson on optimal single item auctions, the incentive compatibility condition is shown to be equivalent to the following simpler conditions on the auction - (i) the allocation ...
4
votes
0answers
58 views

Unique Nash-equilibria in multi-unit auctions with uncertain participation

Setup Consider a one shot sealed bid multi-unit auction where $N$ bidders compete for $K$ identical objects and each bidder $i$ has demand $d_i\in \{1,\dots,K\}$. Bidders receive private i.i.d. ...
3
votes
4answers
695 views

Why are second price auctions preferred if they don't maximize expected revenue?

The reasoning usually given for why you would use a second price auction (SPA) as opposed to a first price auction (FPA) is that FPA encourage underbidding while SPA encourage truthful bidding. That ...
3
votes
3answers
125 views

Bidder Count Impact on Uniform Price Economics

Say we have an uniform price auction where 1 really rare stamp is for sale. Only 5 randomly selected stamp collectors are invited to bid and the stamp ends up selling for 1 million dollars. Now ...
3
votes
1answer
303 views

2 Player All-Pay Auction

Consider a 2 player all-pay auction, bidding for $1. Each submits a bid that is a real number, thus $S_i=[0,\infty)$. The player with a higher bid wins $1, but both players must pay the submitted bid....
3
votes
1answer
2k views

Reverse auction formula

I am studing a little bit of auction theory. I found the optimal bid value in the Milgrom paper for the first price auction that is $$ P=v \frac{n-1}{n} $$ where $P$ is the optimal bid, $v$ is the ...
3
votes
2answers
58 views

Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design vs. Revelation Principle

The abstract of the article "Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations" (Dobzinski, Vondrak, 2016) states A long-standing open question in algorithmic ...
3
votes
1answer
61 views

Expected payment in a second price auction with affiliation

The symmetric bidding strategy in a second-price auction with affiliation is given by $\beta(x)=v(x,x)$, where $v(x,y)=E[V_1|X_1=x,Y_1=y]$ (here $Y_1$ is the highest ordered statistic among the ...
3
votes
2answers
182 views

Virtual valuation when the distribution is discrete

The virtual valuation of a buyer in an auctin is a function used to calculate the expeced revenue of a seller from that buyer. When the buyer's value comes from a continuous distribution with pdf $f$ ...
3
votes
1answer
159 views

The Price is Right Bidding Strategies

I am currently reading this article. If you are unfamiliar with the game, "The Price is Right", at the beginning, four bidders are selected who have to guess the price of some consumer object. ...
3
votes
1answer
234 views

Marginal Revenue Interpretation of Auctions

I'm reading Klemperer's survey on auction theory (pages 17-18) which discusses the relation between traditional microeconomic price theory and the revenue equivalence result. Firstly, I don't quite ...
3
votes
1answer
76 views

Allocating chores using auctions

I live in a student dorm with 16 people and we share a kitchen. Every week someone has to clean the kitchen. Right now we just take turns in a way determined by the numbers of our respective rooms. ...
3
votes
1answer
128 views

Does the VCG algorithm work for any bundle valuation function?

Assume we have $n$ buyers of $|M|=m$ items in a combinatorial auction. So as we know, we can use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) algorithm to allocate bundles of items to buyers as best as possible. ...
3
votes
1answer
69 views

Is there an algorithm to find as many NE as possible in this generalized second price auction?

Suppose three advertisers, I, II, III are participating in an auction for three positions for online advertising, top, middle and bottom. Assume that click per second for a position is not affected ...
3
votes
1answer
38 views

Uniqueness of equilibria in first-price auction with discrete valuations

Assume we have a first-price auction with discrete and independent private values and identical distributions of all bidders. It is known that there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where bidders bid ...
3
votes
0answers
30 views

Ausubel (2004) auction, any implementation?

I'm looking for an implementation of the ascending-bid auction introduced in his 2004 AER paper. More specifically, a market using this framework which either has been reviewed by other scholars or ...
2
votes
1answer
993 views

How do penny auctions make money? [closed]

What are penny auctions? Given the great discounts they claim (up to 95%), how do they make money?
2
votes
2answers
206 views

Second Price Auction - adjusting PDF for reservation price

The situation: There is a second price auction with 2 players. Consider a second-price auction with 2 players. Their valuations of the object at auction are and are independently and identically ...