Questions tagged [bargaining]

The tag has no usage guidance.

7 questions with no upvoted or accepted answers
Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
3
votes
0answers
35 views

Gale's version of the Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1985) model

Likely to be a very stupid doubt. I am reading Douglas Gale's book "The Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium", which presents a brief version of "Equilibrium in a Market with ...
3
votes
0answers
44 views

Asymmetric Nash Bargaining

The Nash bargaining solution selects the unique solution to the maximization problem $\max_{s_1, s_2 } (s_1 - d_1) (s_2 - d_2)$ such that the solution satisfy the following axioms : Invariance ...
2
votes
0answers
18 views

Nash Bargain VS. Rubinstein Game with Outside Option

I am reading a paper, Kessier & Lulfesmann 2006, and find that its main result totally depends on that the model setting is based on a Rubinstein game with outside option rather than a Nash ...
2
votes
0answers
37 views

Fehr-Schmidt, Ultimatum game, Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium

I'm studying the different variations of the ultimatum games. I've spent some time on this following game: Assume now that each player does not only care about the amount of money she receives, but ...
1
vote
0answers
105 views

Take It Or Leave It Strategy: Social Optimum

Here is what I understood Using Backward Induction, I inferred that buyer offers a price, say, $P$ and the seller will sell only if $P \geq c(I)$. Setting the lowest possible Price that will ensure ...
1
vote
0answers
57 views

Two-sided market and bargaining game

I am solving a bargaining problem in which I have two players $player_1 $ and $ player_2 $. Both of them have a service (represented as $ z_1 ,z_2 $) that they can provide . Moreover they will ...
0
votes
0answers
16 views

Negotiations under expected utility maximization

A buyer is negotiating with a used car salesperson. The value of the car to the seller is uniformly distributed between 0 and 5000. Value to the buyer is 50 percent more than that of the seller (i.e. ...