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Questions tagged [bayesian-game]

For questions about Bayesian games. These are strategic interactions when one or more players have incomplete information about other players. General topics of games with asymmetric information may use this tag.

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Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

I've been given a question which I'm struggling with: Take the standard Prisoner's Dilemma game and consider it is played twice. (Players observe the outcome of the first game before playing the ...
Brian's user avatar
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9 votes
2 answers
5k views

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium - Mixed Strategies

What's the correct way to solve BNE in mixed strategies? I've found two conflicting methods used. Two players. Player 1 knows which game is being played, player 2 knows the game is chosen with ...
Brian's user avatar
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9 votes
1 answer
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Take-it-or-leave-it PBE

I've found an interesting question looking at perfect-bayesian-equilibrium. I haven't seen a question where beliefs are not discrete. There is a single potential buyer of an object which has zero ...
Brian's user avatar
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8 votes
1 answer
2k views

What is the difference between Stochastic game and Bayesian game ?

I was studying definitions of Stochastic and Bayesian game and it appears that Stochastic game is a generalized form of Bayesian game. Could anybody please explain the fundamental differences between ...
Sub-Optimal's user avatar
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8 votes
1 answer
160 views

Uniform bounds on rate of merging for Bayesian learners

Update. Cross posted at Cross Validated. In a well-known paper, Blackwell & Dubins (1962) show that the posterior probabilities of two Bayesian agents, whose priors agree on events of measure $0$,...
user avatar
7 votes
1 answer
257 views

Models for online markets with reputation system

The only relevant model I'm aware of is Liu Qingmin(2011 R.E.S). Is there any other decent models dealing with the mechanism of online markets under reputation system, and perhaps linking to ...
Metta World Peace's user avatar
7 votes
1 answer
117 views

Robust asymmetric information?

Bergeman and Morris (2014) explain how the concept of Bayesian Correlated equilibrium contains all the robust predictions in games of incomplete information. In particular, their question is what are ...
Regio's user avatar
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6 votes
1 answer
588 views

Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a first-price auction

In a famous textbook example of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, there is a first-price auction with two independent players. Each player $i$ values the item as $v_i$, which is distributed uniformly in $[...
Erel Segal-Halevi's user avatar
6 votes
1 answer
278 views

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium: obedience

I would like your help to understand the definition of obedience in an incomplete information game at p.7 of this paper. Let me summarise the definition provided in the paper. There are $N\in \...
Star's user avatar
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6 votes
1 answer
345 views

Arguing uniqueness of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in an auction setting

In an auction setting with interdependent values, let $\theta_i$ denote the type of player $i$ and $m_i$ that player's message (a bid, essentially). I have calculated the best response function as: $$...
Shane's user avatar
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5 votes
2 answers
127 views

Information structure for complete information

Model A decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. $\mathcal{Y}$ is a finite set. The state of the world is a random ...
Star's user avatar
  • 446
5 votes
3 answers
678 views

Bayes-Nash equilibrium and correctness of beliefs

Define a Bayesian game as follows: $$G = \left\langle I, \left(A_i,T_i,(p_{t_i})_{t_i \in T_i}, u_i \right)_{i \in I} \right\rangle$$ $I$ is the set of players $A_i$ is the action set for player $i$,...
Shane's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
841 views

Definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium

I have a basic doubt on the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consider the following game: 1) $N$ players. 2) Each player $i$ has a type, assigned by nature and denoted by $\epsilon_i$. ...
Star's user avatar
  • 446
5 votes
1 answer
279 views

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in a Duopoly Cournot Competition

I am having a hard time to solve a Bayesian Nash equilibrium game in a duopoly cournot competition setting. So, I have two firms with given production quantities, let's say $q_1$ and $q_2$ (i.e., not ...
EagleEdge0423's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
579 views

What does 'continuation' as in continuation games, strategies, plays, etc. exactly mean?

I am in my first course in grad level game theory. While I was reading through Fudenberg and Tirole's Game Theory, I constantly come into contact with the word 'continuation' to describe some games ...
David Kim's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
120 views

Bayesian game and the set of types

In a finite Bayesian game, in most textbooks, a type of player $i$ is defined as $\theta_i\in\Theta_i$. Little is said about the "nature" of the set of types. For example, could we have a two-element ...
johnny09's user avatar
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5 votes
2 answers
255 views

Bayesian Mechanism vs Prior-free Mechanism

I have a double auction mechanism in which the valuations of the agents for the items are drawn from a known random distribution. To be precise, the valuations are the probability of each agent ...
Nima Afraz's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
112 views

Features of the set of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium in a single-agent decision problem with uncertainty

I would like your help to better understand the notion of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE) in a single-agent decision problem with uncertainty The notion of BCE is provided in this paper for a ...
Star's user avatar
  • 446
5 votes
1 answer
164 views

The concept of expansion of an information structure

I would like your help to understand the concept of expansion of an information structure in the incomplete information game at p.6-9 this paper. Let me summarise the game as described in the paper. ...
Star's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
1k views

Divinity for Dummies

I understood the general idea of divinity: that it helps to rule out "unreasonable" equilibria. However, can someone explain it in more details with simple examples so that a senior undergrad student ...
Beck's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
94 views

About Two Methods of Computing Bayesian Equilibria

Question I want to compute the Bayesian equilibria for the following Bayesian game: With probability $p$, player 1 would be of type 1.1. With probability $1-p$, player 1 would be of type 1.2. Player ...
Beerus's user avatar
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5 votes
1 answer
397 views

Checking incentive compatibility of a mechanism

I was thrilled at seeing an interesting bidding system in an academic institutions. This bidding is for registration of courses. Each student is allocated some points based on her grade point(GPA). So,...
Sub-Optimal's user avatar
  • 1,106
5 votes
0 answers
138 views

How to find an optimal strategy in an auction?

I have asked this question in mathematics forum as well but since I have not recieved an appropriate answer yet, I ask it here as well. Consider an auction of sculptures by four artists: A, B, C and D....
plpm's user avatar
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5 votes
0 answers
104 views

Can repeated bidding in an auction make each player's type common knowledge?

In Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz(2007), there's a hand-waving argument to justify their setting as a game of complete information: we assume that all values are common ...
Metta World Peace's user avatar
4 votes
2 answers
319 views

Questions of the type "What do you think other people would think?"

For a study in the adoption of new technology, a student and I are developing a questionnaire that will poll domain experts on their opinions of what their colleagues would think about benefits/...
Peter Leopold's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
166 views

Difficulty in understanding the notation related from probability theory with game theory

The question that I have is a little technical and it has to do with the notation and the combination between some mathamatical properties in the probability theory of information economics. Say $\...
Nav89's user avatar
  • 488
4 votes
1 answer
585 views

What is the intuition behind Blackwell's Equivalence Theorem on Information Structures?

Let us suppose that we have a Bayesian game where the information structure is defined to be as $P^X=\{(X,\mathcal{X},P_\theta)\}_{\theta\in\Theta}$ where a signal generated by the information ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
67 views

Correlation device that induces a specific transition probability

Taking a look at this paper of Forges and Vida the authors define a correlation device in page $102$, that is a standard probability space $\left(\Omega,\mathcal{B},\mu\right)$, They assume that the ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
113 views

Social Welfare and Pareto Optimality in a Bayesian Game

In a normal form game with two players, we call a joint strategy $s=(s_1,s_2)$ a Pareto optimal outcome if for no joint strategy $s'$, for all players $i\in\{1,2\}$, we have $$u_i(s')\geq u_i(s)\qquad(...
johnny09's user avatar
  • 613
4 votes
1 answer
263 views

Are there multiple equilibria in the second price auction?

Suppose that $n\geq 2$ bidders compete in a second price auction. Each bidder $i$ knows their own valuation $v_i$, but only knows the distribution generating the valuations of the other players. ...
user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
69 views

Equivalence from correlated/communication equilibrium to Nash Equilibrium?

Taking into account the seminal papers of Forges and Imre Bárány, they proove a very strong result that gives an exact connection among the communication and the correlation equilibrium solution ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
1k views

Is it a weakly dominant strategy to bid your true value in a third-price auction with two identical goods and N uniform distributed bidders?

I am interest in finding the optimal strategy for a single bidder (the BNE), when I have a third-price auction with N bidders and two identical goods. The bidders have iid valuations: U(0,1) I have ...
Sarah Plaug's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
366 views

Blackwell order of information structures

Consider a model where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{V}$. ...
Star's user avatar
  • 446
4 votes
1 answer
332 views

Computing pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite games

I am trying to compute the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of some discrete auctions. More precisely, let us define the strategy of each player as a function mapping from every valuation that they ...
user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
99 views

Why system of beliefs, $\mu(x)$, needed in dynamic incomplete information games

We need to make statements about the sequential rationality of players who are in information sets that are not singletons. In these non-trivial information sets, we need to be able to say something ...
Frank Swanton's user avatar
4 votes
1 answer
181 views

The notions of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in a game with one player

I would like your help to use the correct terminology to define a Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE) and a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in a "game" with one player. The notion of BCE in an $N$-...
Star's user avatar
  • 446
4 votes
0 answers
48 views

Game where you don't know (but can learn) your own type?

Is there a literature out there for games where you don't know your own type, but know it's from a distribution, and can e.g., invest resources to learn your own type prior to moving on with the game? ...
dazednconfused's user avatar
4 votes
0 answers
98 views

Perfect Bayesian Equilibium - Application to game with inconsistent beliefs / no common prior

Does the concept of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium apply only to incomplete games with a common prior / consistent belief? In both Bonanno's "Game Theory" and Osborne's "A Course in ...
oswinso's user avatar
  • 83
3 votes
1 answer
134 views

Adverse selection problem

The classic literature refers to the problem where information asymmetry exists between an informed and an uninformed counterpart as the adverse selection problem, but how can we verify what kind of ...
Nav89's user avatar
  • 488
3 votes
1 answer
500 views

Why is it called Bayesian Persuasion?

I'm sure most of you are familiar with the paper titled "Bayesian Persuasion" by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), (you can find it here). I was wondering what are your thoughts as to why it is called "...
Regio's user avatar
  • 4,188
3 votes
1 answer
247 views

Confusion about multiple information Sets

I'm confronted with the following situation: First of all nature decides which of two games is played. Then each of two players make a simultaneous move, but only player I knows which game is played....
user7802048's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
308 views

Relationship among universal type space, Aumann's semantic knowledge model and Samet's syntactic knowledge model

What's the relationship among universal type space, Aumann's semantic knowledge model and Samet's syntactic knowledge model? Here's my confusion: Regarding universal type space and the model in ...
Metta World Peace's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
66 views

Bergemann and Morris information designer and decision rule concept

Taking a look in the paper of Bergemman and Morris in 2016, they refer to the desicion rule as mapping $$\sigma:\Theta\times T\to\Delta(A)$$ The explanation to understand the notion of it is given as ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
102 views

Bayes correlated equilibrium of Bergemann and Morris

The paper of Bergemann and Morris proves a theorem based on some foundations about the information sets and their expansions. I am trying to understand theorem one intuition, more precisely I cite the ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
3 votes
2 answers
516 views

Mixed Strategies in Bayes Nash Equilibrium (Bayesian Battle of the Sexes). Shouldn't it depend on $p$?

I have a question about calculating mixed strategies in a Bayes Nash Equilibrium in a simple 2-player bimatrix game. To demonstrate the issue, consider ``Bayesian Battle of the Sexes.'' Suppose P1 ...
ABC's user avatar
  • 151
3 votes
1 answer
299 views

How to prove the WPBE is SE in signaling game?

The definition of a signaling game: A signaling game is an extensive game with the following structure: (i) A move of chance first determines a state of the world/type $t ∈ T$, which is drawn from T ...
lalala8797's user avatar
3 votes
2 answers
90 views

Exact definition of one-player Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium

Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world $V$. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{V}$. ...
Star's user avatar
  • 446
3 votes
1 answer
2k views

Game theory with rational and irrational players

Are there game theoretic models where one player is rational and the other is irrational (i.e., plays with behavioral limitations)? The motivation for this question is that behavioral economics has ...
ajkeith's user avatar
  • 35
3 votes
1 answer
156 views

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a two stage game with incomplete information

I would like to solve a game where firms have private information about their own type, but only know the distribution of the other firm's type. They interact in two stages, where the strategies ...
unicoerner's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
69 views

Example of information structure in a one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Model Consider a game where a decision maker (DM) has to choose action $y\in \mathcal{Y}$ possibly without being fully aware of the state of the world. The state of the world has support $\mathcal{...
Star's user avatar
  • 446