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Screening models with multiple goods and interacting costs

I'm looking for a reference in the literature on monopolistic screening/mechanism design, where there are multiple allocative variables and these interact in the agent's utility function. For example, ...
econ1324's user avatar
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help with nested integrals in common agency public goods paper

I'm trying to derive the example function used in a paper I am reading and am stuck. Please help. Below is the equation. For now, all I am requesting is someone to help me solve for p. More details ...
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Why does a buyer-employment contract dominate a spot contract in this example (Bolton & Dewatripont 11.1.2.5, p497)

I'm working through Bolton and Dewatripont, Section 11.1.2, and have some questions about material in 11.2.5 on the bottom of page 497. I've tried to abbreviate the setup below, followed by my ...
akm's user avatar
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Strange screening game were FS contracts equals optimal contracts

Consider the setting where a principal hires an agent to do a project. Payoff from project is $\pi = \beta e$, where $\beta \in \{1,2\}$ is the degree of the agent's talent and $e \in [0, +\infty]$ is ...
Screeningdude's user avatar
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Equation for pure wage contracts in the land market

I am reading "Development Economics" by Debraj Ray. I need to understand the different kinds of contracts in the land market. Chapter 12.3.1 explains the contract forms. The general equation ...
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The most used probability distributions in moral hazard models?

I'm engaged in making a variation of the canonical moral hazard model, but I need some examples of probability distributions to make some simulations and graphs. What are the probability distributions ...
Iriki's user avatar
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A manifold of agents?

In contract theory and mechanism design, if the agents have one-dimensional characteristics, then they are usually considered as a contiuum on $\mathbb R$; if they have n-dimensional type, then they ...
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Dynamic contract theory: Demarzo, Fishman(2007) optimal long term financial contracting

I am reading Demarzo, Fishman(RFS,2007). Any suggestion will be appreciated. My questions are the following: (a) \begin{equation*} b_T^e(a) = \left\{\begin{array}{lll} -e^{(\gamma-r)(...
E.Green's user avatar
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Foreseeability vs negligence

Why is it the case that contractual liability is usually defined by basis of foreseeability rather than negligence (like in tort law)? I am looking a good explanation for this from economics. I ...
user3314's user avatar
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Equilibrium Non-Existence in Moral Hazard with Bilateral Risk Neutrality

Suppose we have one agent and one principal. The agent picks effort level $e\in \{0,1\}$ which is not contractible. The agent is risk neutral with ex-post utility $w-ce$ where $c>0$ and $w$ is the ...
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Moral Hazard in Teams. Deriving Nash Equilibrium with bonus paying sheme

I have a few mathematical problems with the paper Moral hazard in teams, by Bengt Hölmstrom 1982. Theorem 4 Denote the conditional distribution of $x$, given the action vector $a$, by $F(x, a)$ and ...
contracttheory's user avatar
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Value of information in the Moral hazard in teams context

I have a few mathematical problems with the paper Moral hazard in teams 1982 by Bengt Holmstrom, especially in chapter 3. (sufficient statistic) page 330 following The welfare problem can be stated as:...
contracttheory's user avatar
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Incentive compatibility constraint with continuous types

I have a Principal agent problem where principal knows about the information about the agent which is critical to both the parties. Principal is a business tycoon who has an inside information about ...
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Principal agent question

Principal is interested in buying lake. The revenues of operating the lake as a camping site are determined by the weather (a random parameter $w$ distributed uniformly on $[0, 1]$) and by the ...
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