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Questions tagged [dominant-strategy]

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Term for the phenomenon when an undesirable but competitive strategy dominates

For example, in some sports, the use performance enhancing drugs is considered undesirable, but it is difficult or impossible to be competitive unless you use performance enhancing drugs. So, the use ...
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Is this market monopoly or duopoly?

Could you help me to identify monopoly, because I got confused. There is a company with market share of 54 %. The second one has market share of 21 %. Can this market be characterized as monopoly or ...
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Incentive compatibility: Weakly dominant strategy versus Nash equilibrium?

When it comes to proving that a mechanism e.g. auction is incentive compatible this is the approach I'm using: I break down all the cases that might happen if the agent reports an untruthful value to ...
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3 by 3 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

I got this question in the exam to find the PSNE of the following payoff matrix: \begin{bmatrix}(2,2)&(4,1)&(2,1)\\(1,5)&(6,6)&(1,1)\\(1,2)&(1,1)&(4,4)\end{bmatrix} I found ...
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Derivation of Equilibrium Strategy in 1st-price Auction?

Hey, everyone. I desperately need help understanding some math in auction theory. I have been writing a paper as an undergrad for auction theory, and after all of my research I just cannot understand ...
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Nash Equilibrium and Dominant Strategy

If I have a game that goes as follow: Player 1 is the row player and player 2 is the column player. I think that the Nash Equilibria should be (10, 5) and (5, 10), since neither of the player has ...
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Reference for truthful Nash on cartesian domain implies strategy-proofness

Consider a mechanism $M: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow X$, where $\mathcal{R}$ is a domain of preference profiles $R = (R_1,\dots, R_n)$, and $X$ is a set of outcomes. I believe that the following is a ...