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Questions tagged [dynamic-games]

Questions related to the application of game theory to situations in which actions are taken sequentially.

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1answer
41 views

Sequential Game is Extensive form game?

Dynamic, Sequential, Stochastic, Extensive form and Evolutionary games. I know what all of them mean very roughly. I want to clarify them. As I understand Extensive form is a description of a ...
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0answers
18 views

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with incomplete information [duplicate]

Take the following two-stage game with incomplete information and simultaneous actions in each state. (1) In the beginning of stage 1 players 1 and 2 do not observe the value of $\epsilon$ but they ...
2
votes
1answer
32 views

Definition of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Take a two-stage game with complete information and simultaneous actions in each state: (1) Player 1 and 2 simultaneously choose action $a_1\in A_1$ and $a_2\in A_2$ respectively. (2) Player 1 and ...
5
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1answer
101 views

What is the game theory of retaliatory trade tariffs?

Suppose no tariffs, or negligible tariffs, exist between nations A and B, and suddenly A introduces substantive tariffs on certain products A imports from B. In theory, this could lead to B and A ...
0
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1answer
55 views

Spence's Job Market Signaling Game

I have a little doubt in the Job Market Signalling Game. I am referring to A Primer in Game Theory: Gibbons, Chapter 4, Signaling Games The attached paragraph refers to a Separating Equilibrium case ...
2
votes
1answer
74 views

Repeated Game SPNE

I approached this question in this way: $(P_1,P_2), (R_1,R_2), (S_1,S_2)$ are the Nash Equilibria of the Stage 1 game. For the given strategy to be sustained as SPNE, there should be no way unilateral ...
1
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1answer
46 views

SPNE and Pareto Optimality

"The SPNE of a sequential game might not necessarily be Pareto Optimal" I understand the definitons of Nash Equilibria and Pareto Optimality and that these are not synonymous concepts. An example in ...
-1
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1answer
134 views

Sequential Bertrand game with differentiated goods, how to write the strategies of firm 2 [closed]

In a Bertrand competition with differentiated goods where firms set the prices sequentially, we have the following demand functions: q1 is quantity of goods demanded for firm 1 q2 is quantity of ...
2
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0answers
211 views

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Pure Strategies in Sequential Games [closed]

If I have a sequential game, i.e. in each node (that I will call $t$) only one player choose an strategy from a finite space of strategies, Is it true there always exist a subgame perfect equilibrium ...
2
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2answers
122 views

Price setting firms with cost reduction technology

As part of my undergraduate studies in Industrial Economics, I am trying to solve the following question: Two price-setting firms are competing in a market for a homogeneous product. There are 10,...
3
votes
1answer
66 views

Extensive Form Games

( The game of “ chicken”) Two cars are driving at each other at great speeds. If nobody changes directions, in 3 seconds they will collide and die a gruesome death, yielding payoffs of −100 for both ...
1
vote
1answer
50 views

World as a society of interlinked multiplayer individuals

If you were to take a game-theoretic model of a world in which each individual tried to optimize their utility function / goals then how would you go about designing a computer simulation of the ...
1
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0answers
76 views

Dynamic dividing a dollar game

The question is a reformulation of an incomplete version. Consider the following dynamic dividing a dollar game where agent 1 claims $x(t)$ of the dollar and agent 2 $y(t)$ (paper). \begin{align} &...
1
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0answers
62 views

Dynamic contract theory: Demarzo, Fishman(2007) optimal long term financial contracting

I am reading Demarzo, Fishman(RFS,2007). Any suggestion will be appreciated. My questions are the following: (a) \begin{equation*} b_T^e(a) = \left\{\begin{array}{lll} -e^{(\gamma-r)(...
2
votes
1answer
58 views

Terminology for “part” of extensive form game

How should I call a "part" of an extensive form game which is neither (i) a subgame, nor (ii) a stage in a repeated game? For instance, consider the class of games constructed by "stacking" 2 ...
6
votes
2answers
175 views

Multiple equilibria: which one to select?

There are two agents $i=1,2$. Consider the following programm \begin{align} &V_1(x_0) := \max_u \int^\infty_0 e^{-\rho t}F_1(x(t),u(t),v(t))dt\\ &V_2(x_0) := \max_v \int^\infty_0 e^{-\rho t}...
3
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0answers
65 views

Converging Trajectories and Sufficiency for Optimality

(The question is loosely relatet to this thread.) In the paper "Feedback Equilibria for a class of non-linear Differential Games" by Mäler et al. it is stated (p. 14) In fact sufficiency is ...
5
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0answers
95 views

Can repeated bidding in an auction make each player's type common knowledge?

In Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz(2007), there's a hand-waving argument to justify their setting as a game of complete information: we assume that all values are common ...
6
votes
1answer
102 views

How to verify Value Function in nonzero sum two player Differential Game?

There are two agents $i=1,2$. The state $k$ is governed by $\tau_i\in[0,1]$ where \begin{align} \dot{k} = f(k,\tau_1,\tau_2). \end{align} Define the value function of player $i$ by \begin{align} v_i(...
9
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1answer
283 views

What does Battigalli really mean by “Players can not choose strategies, they can only choose actions.”?

In this video (from 7: 30 to 9: 00)on Youtube, Battigalli mentions the state of world for a simple three-legged centipede game, which, in his own word, is "$\ldots$a description of everything ...
5
votes
2answers
137 views

Repeated games without a beginning and an end

I'm interested to know results on repeated games indexing each stage game by $\mathbb Z$ which contrast with those indexed by $\mathbb Z_+$. It seems to me this could be quite different from repeated ...
7
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1answer
240 views

Models for online markets with reputation system

The only relevant model I'm aware of is Liu Qingmin(2011 R.E.S). Is there any other decent models dealing with the mechanism of online markets under reputation system, and perhaps linking to ...
5
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2answers
538 views

One-shot deviation principle for infinite repeated games and dynamic programming

In a context that future return is discounted by a constant parameter, one-shot deviation principle holds for both repeated games and dynamic programming. Because, in repeated games, a one-shot ...
8
votes
1answer
189 views

Identification with BBL

In the last few years, the estimator proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin ('07) for dynamic games has been gaining popularity. It is relatively straight forward and is one of the only viable options ...