All Questions
Tagged with nash-equilibrium extensive-games
8 questions
2
votes
0
answers
71
views
Are there Sequential Equilibria that are not Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibria, that don't involve Weakly Dominated strategies?
I'm taking an advanced course (graduate level) in Game Theory. My class has covered several equilibrium concepts, up to Sequential Equilibrium.
The professor said that there are already more ...
- 2,351
2
votes
1
answer
554
views
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when there is a tie in payoffs seems problematic
My question follows from this question: https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/2132846/game-theory-subgame-perfect-nash-equilibrium-in-a-sequential-game-with-identica from Maths stackexchange.
Based ...
- 1,959
1
vote
0
answers
41
views
bargaining game information/equlibria/gametree/normalform
I have a game with two players, player one offers player two one of two cars, car 1(M) has value 2 and car 2 (H) has value 1. Player two can accept (A) or reject (R) the offer. Now I have to answer ...
- 11
1
vote
0
answers
373
views
Does Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) allow for credible threats?
Consider the following extensive-form game:
In one alternative, Player 2 chooses G and E and Player 1 chooses D. However, Player 2 can increase her gain by making a credible threat and switch from G ...
- 111
1
vote
1
answer
394
views
Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium perfect information
This might be a stupid question but please bear with me. I'm trying to solve this game but I'm in doubt on how to represent the strategy profile of the game. The game looks like this in extensive-form....
- 105
2
votes
1
answer
1k
views
Finding pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
I'm interested in finding the pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the game below. What is confusing me is that after player A chooses between reducing and not reducing his end payoffs, ...
- 135
2
votes
1
answer
369
views
How to demonstrate that a game always have a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies?
If I have an specific extensive game, with only a finite set of strategies, how can I demonstrate that the game always have a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies? My first intuition was to ...
- 149
6
votes
1
answer
15k
views
Difference between Sequential and Weak Sequential (Weak Perfect Bayesian) Equilibria?
This is in reference to the Game theoretic concepts as Nash equilibrium refinements. Sequential equilibrium are often defined as satisfying two conditions: consistency and sequential rationality. ...
- 61