Skip to main content

All Questions

Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
1 vote
1 answer
97 views

Existence of Nash equilibrium in auctions with common values and complete information

Suppose that a seller wants to allocate a single object among $n \in \{2, 3, \dots\}$ agents. Agents know the object is worth $v \geq 0$, so that values are common and agents have no private ...
PackExchange's user avatar
2 votes
1 answer
49 views

Geometric Interpretation of the Potential Function of a Game

One geometric interpretation of (at least one term of) the potential function I've come across is as the Riemann-approximated area under an individual player's cost as a function of the number of ...
user10478's user avatar
  • 455
0 votes
1 answer
203 views

Why are Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria special cases of Correlated Equilibria and Coarse Correlated Equilibria?

In a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, each player constructs their own probability distribution over the set of their respective possible strategies. In a Correlated Equilibrium or a Coarse Correlated ...
user10478's user avatar
  • 455
1 vote
1 answer
36 views

Asymmetries in Equilibrium Utility

In this lecture, the professor says that all Nash Equilibria have the same utility in non-atomic selfish routing, whereas this is not guaranteed in atomic selfish routing. It is unclear how general ...
user10478's user avatar
  • 455
4 votes
1 answer
70 views

Equivalence from correlated/communication equilibrium to Nash Equilibrium?

Taking into account the seminal papers of Forges and Imre Bárány, they proove a very strong result that gives an exact connection among the communication and the correlation equilibrium solution ...
Hunger Learn's user avatar
3 votes
1 answer
107 views

Non-Bayesian Mechanism Design

Suppose we have a mechanism where a finite number of agents possess private information that is not drawn from a probability distribution. The agents' types are given and fixed but agents only know ...
johnny09's user avatar
  • 613
2 votes
1 answer
170 views

Incentive compatibility: Weakly dominant strategy versus Nash equilibrium?

When it comes to proving that a mechanism e.g. auction is incentive compatible this is the approach I'm using: I break down all the cases that might happen if the agent reports an untruthful value to ...
Nima Afraz's user avatar