# Questions tagged [repeated-games]

The tag has no usage guidance.

30 questions
Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
50 views

Dear all, I am studying the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. I have so many questions about the proof of lemma 3.6 in slide 22. First of all, why we can write $$P_{\widehat{\sigma}_{i}, \... 0 votes 1 answer 45 views ### How does this reporting correspondence is redefined? Let \mathcal{R}_i be a non-empty, finite set and define the reporting correspondence R_i:S→2^{\mathcal{R}_i}-\{\emptyset\} to be a mapping from player i’s type space to the collection of subsets ... 0 votes 1 answer 89 views ### How to show that a strategy is a SPNE in repeated games Consider the down below which I have trouble with solving. For part 1) I have said that a possible outcome path is to play (D,D) in the first round and for all rounds following until i \leq 298. ... 1 vote 1 answer 204 views ### Simultaneous vs Sequential Games [closed] Is there a way to characterize the distinction between simultaneous vs sequential games? I'm trying to describe a situation where players can only take actions without knowledge of other players' ... 4 votes 1 answer 134 views ### Finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with switching cost I'm doing this finitely repeated Prisoner's dilemma with switching costs but I have trouble showing the fact that \varepsilon had to be 1 < \varepsilon < 2. I do see why and that it is a ... 1 vote 1 answer 159 views ### Infinitely repeated game with stationary and symmetric equilibrium We have two players playing a repeated game. At every period, each player decides to stay or to quit. If both decide to stay, then they both receive 1. If either decides to quit, then the quitter ... 2 votes 1 answer 99 views ### Finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without sub-game perfection Suppose that two individuals play the prisoner's dilemma (PD) a finite number of times; and assume that they both discount the future at a constant rate. Can cooperation be sustained by a Nash ... 0 votes 1 answer 57 views ### Could someone help guide me on finding the players with perfect recall, and those without? Could someone help guide me on finding the players with perfect recall, and those without? For those players that do not have perfect recall, what do they forget? Step-by-step guidance would be ... 2 votes 0 answers 403 views ### Discount factor and deviating from strategy - Game Theory I have an exercise in Steven Tadelis Game theory Introduction book (10.2) : Grim Trigger: Consider the infinitely repeated game with discount factor δ < 1 of the following variant of the Prisoner’... 2 votes 3 answers 2k views ### Why is the tat-for-tat strategy a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games? Why is the tat-for-tat strategy a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games, but not a Nash equilibrium in a finite scenario? Specifically for this matrix: Assume higher payoffs reflect higher ... 2 votes 1 answer 85 views ### Simple hawk-dove type super-game We have the following super-game: \begin{array}{cc} & a_1 & a_2 \\ a_1 & 0,0 & -1,1 \\ a_2 & 1,-1 & -2,-2 \end{array} I want to show that both the trigger (or grim) ... 0 votes 1 answer 43 views ### Penance strategy game theory I am having some difficulty in understanding the following use of the penance strategy as a strategy to support compliance in the repeated game presented in Asheim et al. (2006). I understand penance ... 0 votes 1 answer 39 views ### Clarification of iterated prisoners dilemma In the description of an iterated prisoner's dilemma on Wikipedia, it states that in order for a game to be considered iterable, it must conform to the rule 2R > T + S, where R is the reward for ... 2 votes 1 answer 200 views ### Repeated Game SPNE I approached this question in this way: (P_1,P_2), (R_1,R_2), (S_1,S_2) are the Nash Equilibria of the Stage 1 game. For the given strategy to be sustained as SPNE, there should be no way unilateral ... 2 votes 1 answer 85 views ### Repeated game with stage game has more than 1 NE Given the game like Prisoner's dilemma (infinitely undiscounted) and each person has 3 actions in every period: confess defect and kill, and the payoff matrix have 2 NE as (D,D),(K,K). Can I still ... 4 votes 0 answers 329 views ### Why is the symmetric grim trigger not a Nash? Consider the stage game: Let \delta\in(0,1) be the discount factor. Let G be the symmetric grim trigger strategy profile. The payoffs are then$$E_{A}(G) = E_{B}(G) = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty}3\delta^{... 369 views

### Tit-For-Stat Strategy Best Replies

Let $\delta\in(0,1)$ be the discount factor. Consider the stage game in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game: The goal is to derive conditions on $\delta$ such that the symmetric tit-for-... 1k views

### Game theory with rational and irrational players

Are there game theoretic models where one player is rational and the other is irrational (i.e., plays with behavioral limitations)? The motivation for this question is that behavioral economics has ...
59 views

### Is it possible to transfer information through strategic games?

Let's say that there are 2 players Player A and Player B, engaged in a set of repeated strategic games. Is it then possible to transfer information from one player, say Player A, to the other player, ...
1 vote
371 views

### Collusion, deviation from equilibrium

Two firms can produce either low (L), medium (M) or high (H) quantity. The payoff matrix is given by: What is the outcome of this game if firms play only once? Suppose the game is played for infinite ...
62 views

### Maximum level of profit attainable when discount factor is too low

This is a question I encountered during my undergraduate studies in Industrial Economics. So the question goes like this: Consider two identical firms with constant marginal cost $c$ which ...
289 views

1k views

### Real-life applications of repeated games theory

What are some scenarios in which the theory of repeated games have been applied? I am looking, for example, for scenarios in which a government, a firm or a person accepted a decision which relied ...
1 vote
46 views

### Repeatedly playing an equilibrium in a repeated game

What is a formal proof to this known fact about repeated games? The situation in which, in every time step, the players play a Nash equilibrium in the basic game unconditioned on history, is a Nash ...