Questions tagged [signaling]

In signaling games, an informed sender moves first. Their action may "signal" information about the sender's type to an uniformed receiver who then acts based on an updated belief.

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Signaling in zero-sum games?

The foundation of this question is a bit vague (based on something overheard at a conference) but I'm hoping someone here can provide some clarification. I overheard a conversation between two ...
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Signalling Model (How to solve a differential equation?)

I'm currently reading "SAVING RATES AND POVERTY: THE ROLE OF CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION AND HUMAN CAPITAL" by Omer Moav and Zvika Neeman, and I encounter some problem deriving one of the equations. ...
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Spence's Job Market Signaling Game

I have a little doubt in the Job Market Signalling Game. I am referring to A Primer in Game Theory: Gibbons, Chapter 4, Signaling Games The attached paragraph refers to a Separating Equilibrium case ...
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0answers
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Three stage two player signalling game, pooling equilbrium

I am solving a three-stage game in which first the sender sends the signal, then the receiver acts based on the signal and finally, the sender moves again. The sender has two types high and low and ...
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2answers
157 views

Beliefs about equilibrium paths with overlapping strategies

This is a basic question, but I cannot find the answer to it. In short, equilibria are often conditioned on a specific strategy. E.g., given A's strategy, B updates her beliefs to xyz. My problem is ...
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1answer
401 views

Equilibria in Signaling and Screening

I am now studying the Spence's job market model using both signaling and screening. It turns out that, when a worker's reservation value = 0 (she can get 0 if she does not get employed), then both ...
5
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1answer
498 views

Divinity for Dummies

I understood the general idea of divinity: that it helps to rule out "unreasonable" equilibria. However, can someone explain it in more details with simple examples so that a senior undergrad student ...
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2answers
379 views

Is it possible to have a signaling game in which all players are both informed (about themselves) and uniformed (about other players)?

So far, the models of Signaling Games I have seen involve two players. One player is known as the Sender and has more information. The other player is known as the Receiver and has less information. ...
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Can I refine the set of equilibria in a signaling game to the sender-optimal outcome?

Main question: I've been reading about communication games a lot, and I'm wondering if there are good criteria to select between two separating-ish equilibria. I think of a separating equilibria as ...
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2answers
210 views

When should a receiver randomize across actions in a signaling game?

Suppose there is a signaling game with a finite message space $M$, finite action space $A$, and finite type space $T$. Even simpler, all sender types have identical preferences (the receiver just ...
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How to intuitively understand the 'Intuitive criterion'?

The intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps is a refinement to minimise the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in signalling games. What would a simple and intuitive example to explain this criterion be? ...