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2 votes
1 answer
19 views

Public Good Provision and median voting principle

This is a question that came in one of the previous year's entrance test to a master's program in a reputed institution in my country. I am also attaching how I tackled the problem in each part of the ...
1 vote
0 answers
43 views

Economics of tradeable votes

In their book "Radical Markets", the authors (Posner and Weyl) suggest a market for votes, where citizens can freely buy and sell their votes. But there is a catch: in order to have $k$ ...
2 votes
1 answer
38 views

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Proof - Unicity of "dictator"

I have a hard time understanding completely Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem proof, even the very pedagogical one by Geanakoplos, that can be found for instance here : https://users.ssc.wisc.edu/~dquint/...
0 votes
0 answers
128 views

McKelvey-Schofield Chaos Theorem Without Agenda Setter

The McKelvey-Schofield Chaos Theorem states that in a multidimensional preference space, it is almost always possible to reverse engineer the implementation of your desired policy by constructing an ...
0 votes
1 answer
138 views

(Game Theory) Why is voting for your worst alternative a weakly dominated action?

I don't fully understand why voting for your worst alternative is a weakly dominated action. The question comes from a question I'm working on: "Assume there are three candidates, A,B and C,...
0 votes
1 answer
137 views

If GOOG shares confer no voting rights, where do their value comes from?

I recently found out that the difference between GOOG and GOOGL shares is that GOOG shares do not have voting rights. Then I read that the leadership is not planning to pay dividends anytime soon (...
2 votes
1 answer
92 views

Part of proof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

I'm currently working through Nisan's Algorithmic Game Theory, Chapter 9 (Introduction to Mechanism Design). A part of the proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is given as "obvious," ...
0 votes
0 answers
43 views

What does social choice theory say about how to assign different positions to every member in a committee?

Consider the following setting: A committee has $N$ members. There are $m$ types of positions in the committee. For each type of positions $1 \leq i \leq m$, there are $n_i$ identitical positions for ...
5 votes
0 answers
47 views

Comparing voting methods when there are only two voters

Consider the Schulze, Kemeny-Young, Ranked Pairs and Borda count voting methods. (The last is obviously the odd one out in this list!) Suppose that there are only two voters. Each voter gives a ...
2 votes
1 answer
60 views

Ranked choice preference with ties - Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

My question relates to my understanding of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and ranked choice. It seems to me that the requirements on social choice functions are too strict. A social choice function ...
5 votes
3 answers
145 views

Weighted voting: Vote of representative weighted by number of election votes

I was wondering if there is any literature on voting systems where voters elect representatives, and in the representatives' assembly the vote of each representative is weighted by the number of votes ...
2 votes
1 answer
232 views

Uncovered set versus top cycle set (voting theory)

I am struggling to see when, given a policy set $X = {x_{1}, … , x_{m}} $ , with $m > 1$, its uncovered set and top cycle set may not coincide (i.e. when the top cycle set has policies that are ...
0 votes
0 answers
19 views

Feasible approaches to allocate n unique indivisable items among n individuals

Suppose I have n individuals and n unique, indivisible objects of potential value. I want to allocate those objects so as to make total welfare as great as possible, subject to the constraint that no ...
1 vote
1 answer
308 views

Majority Rule and Single Peakedness

Majority Rule will induce non empty choice set if individual preferences are single peaked Is this statement true? I have some trouble in understanding the meaning of 'single peakedness' in context ...
2 votes
1 answer
170 views

Question about the "No Dictator" Criterion in Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

I have a question about Arrow's impossibility theorem. I'm not sure I understand exactly what is meant by the "no dictator" criterion. Does the presence of a "dictator" mean that across all possible ...
1 vote
0 answers
52 views

Is quadratic voting efficient in multiple winner elections?

Quadratic voting approximates efficiency for a large collective making a sequence of binary decisions. What if a group can take multiple actions? Say, for example, a series of decisions where 2 out of ...
2 votes
0 answers
210 views

Isn't it trivial that preferences are single-peaked over two alternatives?

I'm studying Down's Median Voter Theorem which states that if voters have single-peaked preferences over two alternatives arranged along a one-dimensional political spectrum, a majority rule voting ...
2 votes
1 answer
132 views

gibbard-satterthwaite theorem and median voting

The gibbard-saterthwatie theorem states that a social choice function where truthfullness is a dominant strategy must be dictatorial. However, in a median voting system, with single peaked preferences ...
6 votes
0 answers
117 views

How do you strategically vote to put someone in last place?

I watch a dumb reality TV show which has a certain number of contestants to start with, and every week one contestant is eliminated. Here's how the elimination process works. Every week a certain ...
3 votes
0 answers
108 views

Analyses of the paradox of voting — given that close elections are usually disputed?

In the standard analysis of the paradox of voting, votes are pivotal only in two scenarios (exact tie or win by 1). But in reality, vote counting is difficult and messy. And in reality, close ...