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How do you strategically vote to put someone in last place?

I watch a dumb reality TV show which has a certain number of contestants to start with, and every week one contestant is eliminated. Here's how the elimination process works. Every week a certain ...
Keshav Srinivasan's user avatar
5 votes
0 answers

Comparing voting methods when there are only two voters

Consider the Schulze, Kemeny-Young, Ranked Pairs and Borda count voting methods. (The last is obviously the odd one out in this list!) Suppose that there are only two voters. Each voter gives a ...
cfp's user avatar
  • 252
3 votes
0 answers

Analyses of the paradox of voting — given that close elections are usually disputed?

In the standard analysis of the paradox of voting, votes are pivotal only in two scenarios (exact tie or win by 1). But in reality, vote counting is difficult and messy. And in reality, close ...
user avatar
2 votes
1 answer

Public Good Provision and median voting principle

This is a question that came in one of the previous year's entrance test to a master's program in a reputed institution in my country. I am also attaching how I tackled the problem in each part of the ...
Kanooz's user avatar
  • 41
2 votes
1 answer

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem Proof - Unicity of "dictator"

I have a hard time understanding completely Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem proof, even the very pedagogical one by Geanakoplos, that can be found for instance here :
Kinta's user avatar
  • 21
2 votes
0 answers

Isn't it trivial that preferences are single-peaked over two alternatives?

I'm studying Down's Median Voter Theorem which states that if voters have single-peaked preferences over two alternatives arranged along a one-dimensional political spectrum, a majority rule voting ...
pafnuti's user avatar
  • 225
1 vote
0 answers

Economics of tradeable votes

In their book "Radical Markets", the authors (Posner and Weyl) suggest a market for votes, where citizens can freely buy and sell their votes. But there is a catch: in order to have $k$ ...
Erel Segal-Halevi's user avatar
1 vote
0 answers

Is quadratic voting efficient in multiple winner elections?

Quadratic voting approximates efficiency for a large collective making a sequence of binary decisions. What if a group can take multiple actions? Say, for example, a series of decisions where 2 out of ...
Jorge's user avatar
  • 11
0 votes
0 answers

McKelvey-Schofield Chaos Theorem Without Agenda Setter

The McKelvey-Schofield Chaos Theorem states that in a multidimensional preference space, it is almost always possible to reverse engineer the implementation of your desired policy by constructing an ...
user10478's user avatar
  • 423
0 votes
0 answers

What does social choice theory say about how to assign different positions to every member in a committee?

Consider the following setting: A committee has $N$ members. There are $m$ types of positions in the committee. For each type of positions $1 \leq i \leq m$, there are $n_i$ identitical positions for ...
user141240's user avatar
0 votes
0 answers

Feasible approaches to allocate n unique indivisable items among n individuals

Suppose I have n individuals and n unique, indivisible objects of potential value. I want to allocate those objects so as to make total welfare as great as possible, subject to the constraint that no ...
andrewH's user avatar
  • 335