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Suppose that we have a communication game of $N$ players. Every player $i$ receives a tuple of $N-1$ messages that is a recommended strategy of the other player $j$. I define the recommended strategie …

In many microeconomic models, we read the assumption that agents have CARA normal utility preferences. We need the assumption of the utility to do pricing, but should someone do differently? Namely, …

The characteristics of market liquidity, accoridng to Kyle, are tightness of the market, depth of the marekt and resiliency of prices. By referring to tightness, it descriebes the cost of turning arou …

Following the literature of information asymmetry (see in Kyle among others), we have seen that many papers introduce a private signal, that is $$S=\tilde{v}+\tilde{e}$$ where, $(\tilde{v},\tilde{e}) …

Suppose that $z(\cdot)$ is the demand function of an individual (consumer/investor) and $p$ is the price of the commodity/asset demanded. Does anybody know what is the intuition behind the following e …

Do the slope of a linear demand function and the elastisicy of demand coincide when we use specific preferences for pricing. As a paradigm, if we consider the case of CARA normal preferences, by solvi …

Suppose that we have a two players game, where $(S^i)_{i=1}^2$ denotes the set of pure strategies for each one. The set of mixed strategies of player $i$ is denoted by $\Sigma^i=\Delta(S^i)$ while $\S …

I have a simple question though confusio for me. In game theory we usully write thet a strategy is a mapping from the set of types $T$ to the simplex set of actions (refering to mixed mixed strategies …

I am having the following setup of privately known signals and I am trying to understand an assumption. Here, I quote the setup. Consider two agents idexed by $i=\{1,2\}$ and each one observes some pr …

The certainty equivalent is a guaranteed return that someone would accept now, rather than taking a chance on a higher, but uncertain, return in the future. Otherwise, some definitions say that the ce …

What is the difference between the demand schedule and the demand curve that a monopolist or monopsonist has? Could someone provide details for both cases or even some paradigm or a graph. I can not c …

I have a question that seems easy but I want some clarification. Suppose that we have a communication Bayesian game. The game starts when the players learn their prior infornation and after this they …

Does anybody know, any (advanced/classic) textbook that combines game theory with differential equations in mathematical economics. Specifically, I an interested in asymmetric information problems.

Consider a game $G=(N, (A^i)_{i\in N}, (g^i)_{i\in N})$, $N=\{1,2,\dots,n\}$, $A=\Pi_{i\in N}A_i$ is the set of actions and $g^i:A\to \mathbb{R}$ is the payoff function. The latter can be extended fro …

In Heller et al, they use the Osborne and Rubinstein formal definition for the extensive form games with public information. To some point they refer to the following two properties $P$ is a mapping …