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Auction with independent private values - An example from Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict by Roger Myerson

(1) The auction is a Bayesian game. Players' types are their values, and their actions are their bids. A strategy in a Bayesian game is a function mapping types to actions. Here, this is a "bid-...
VARulle's user avatar
  • 6,900
1 vote

All-pay auction question problem

To supplement Amit's answer, we can get the same answer using Myerson's trick. This trick is "halfway" between Amit's answer and using the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. First, we may consider ...
Joseph Basford's user avatar
1 vote

All-pay auction question problem

For the Bayesian all-pay-auction game above where valuations are private information, let $b:[0,1]\rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ be the symmetric equilibrium strategy which is strictly increasing and ...
Amit's user avatar
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1 vote
Accepted

Equilibrium of Perturbed Dollar Auction Game - An Example from Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict by Roger Myerson

Let us describe the mixed strategy played by both players 1 and 2 using the probability density function $f$. We say that a pure strategy $x$ is in the support $S$ of a mixed strategy $f$ if $f(x)>...
Giskard's user avatar
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