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As one of the comments points out, there are many models of equilibria in insurance markets. But it sounds to me like you are referring to the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) paradigm. I will provide a basic summary of the key takeaways here, but there is a more complete explanation in this set of slides and in those from any second-year graduate course in Public ...


2

Not all principal-agent problems are the result of incomplete contracts, no. In fact, in most principal-agent problems, complete contracts are assumed. An incomplete contract is one that cannot be contingent on every possible outcome that could occur after the contract is signed. You can't write a contract that gives out a different payment to each party ...


2

Yes, there are models that reconcile Hart’s property rights theory with Williamson’s emphasis on haggling and ex post inefficiencies. Hart and Moore have developed a behavioral theory of contracts as reference points. They argue that contractual parties engage in ex post inefficient shading activities when they are aggrieved (which happens when they do not ...


1

I did not have either the time or the courage to plough through the text. The last consolidated text I could find stems from 2014 and has since been amended with an annex. Changes made are unclear to me. The full text can be found here. Excerpts that might be useful in this case are article 1.2 and 1.3 with respect to the scope of the application. Other ...


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