6
votes
Accepted
Intuition of solution concepts in Non-cooperative games
The idea of a solvable game is probably inspired by the theory of two-player zero-sum games. Such games are known to be solvable; a simple consequence of the minimax theorem.
One way to think about ...
- 9,330
4
votes
Does Cournot competition have unique Nash Equilibriium in more than 2 firms?
Consider the following situation:
Demand is given by $P^d(Q) = \max(12-Q, 0)$
There are two firms and each firm $i\in\{1,2\}$ has a cost function:
\begin{eqnarray*} c_i(q_i) =\begin{cases} 16 & \...
- 4,417
3
votes
Looking for a paper on game theory as a beautiful thing, not needing immediate purpose
I believe you're looking for the following passage from Ariel Rubinstein's Economic Fables:
As for me, I was fortunate to be present at stages of Nash’s journey
and the march of game theory from the ...
- 14.3k
3
votes
Setting up the model for a pie-sharing problem
With discounting, the situation is a classic Rubinstein bargaining game, in which two players make alternating offers to split a shrinking pie.
Without discounting, I'm not sure an equilibrium ...
- 14.3k
3
votes
Accepted
Symmetry of a game
I split my answer in two parts, one about how symmetries are defined and the other what the meaning of a symmetric tuple is.
In principle, a symmetry is a permutation of the disjoint union of all ...
- 9,330
3
votes
Accepted
Nash Equilibrium with Constraints on Decision Variables
Usually in (non-coopeative) game theory, one assumes that players take their actions independently.
In this sense, a players' set of feasible actions should be independent of the action taken by the ...
- 8,737
2
votes
Setting up the model for a pie-sharing problem
Discounting does not work like that. Discounting means how much you discount the future relative to the present---e.g., receiving \$1 tomorrow is the equivalent of receiving \$0.90 today.
What you are ...
- 131
2
votes
Any good resources on Information Economics Theory?
For the basics I always liked Varian's "Microeconomic Analysis" (the graduate book).
For a good introduction into game theory (with a nice chapter on signalling) I would first read Gibbons' &...
- 131
1
vote
(Game Theory) Why is voting for your worst alternative a weakly dominated action?
To see that voting $C$ for a type $A$ voter is weakly dominated you need to find a strategy that results in a weakly better outcome irrespective of the behavior of the other voters. Voting $A$ would ...
Only top scored, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible