# Tag Info

Accepted

### Intuition of solution concepts in Non-cooperative games

The idea of a solvable game is probably inspired by the theory of two-player zero-sum games. Such games are known to be solvable; a simple consequence of the minimax theorem. One way to think about ...
• 9,330

### Does Cournot competition have unique Nash Equilibriium in more than 2 firms?

Consider the following situation: Demand is given by $P^d(Q) = \max(12-Q, 0)$ There are two firms and each firm $i\in\{1,2\}$ has a cost function: \begin{eqnarray*} c_i(q_i) =\begin{cases} 16 & \...
• 4,417

### Looking for a paper on game theory as a beautiful thing, not needing immediate purpose

I believe you're looking for the following passage from Ariel Rubinstein's Economic Fables: As for me, I was fortunate to be present at stages of Nash’s journey and the march of game theory from the ...
• 14.3k

### Setting up the model for a pie-sharing problem

With discounting, the situation is a classic Rubinstein bargaining game, in which two players make alternating offers to split a shrinking pie. Without discounting, I'm not sure an equilibrium ...
• 14.3k
Accepted

### Symmetry of a game

I split my answer in two parts, one about how symmetries are defined and the other what the meaning of a symmetric tuple is. In principle, a symmetry is a permutation of the disjoint union of all ...
• 9,330
Accepted

### Nash Equilibrium with Constraints on Decision Variables

Usually in (non-coopeative) game theory, one assumes that players take their actions independently. In this sense, a players' set of feasible actions should be independent of the action taken by the ...
• 8,737

### Setting up the model for a pie-sharing problem

Discounting does not work like that. Discounting means how much you discount the future relative to the present---e.g., receiving \$1 tomorrow is the equivalent of receiving \$0.90 today. What you are ...
To see that voting $C$ for a type $A$ voter is weakly dominated you need to find a strategy that results in a weakly better outcome irrespective of the behavior of the other voters. Voting $A$ would ...