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Two notes. A. "Conditioning on information" has always been applied in economics without much attention to probability theory-rigor, because it has (indeed) such a strong intuitive sense: "based on the information I have (where "information" here means data, processing algorithms, psychological makeup, almost anything) I somehow form ...


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Two points. Common knowledge is defined by Aumann in terms of partitions, not $\sigma$-algebras. There is generally no natural correspondence between these. The grand state space is trivially common knowledge. So however you conceive of the relevant states, something that holds everywhere, such as the structure of the model, is common knowledge even if ...


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Here are my thoughts. Because the sender commits to a disclosure policy, how you stipulate off-path beliefs doesn't matter (phrased loosely). That is, the modification to PBE is trivial: any optimal persuasion policy corresponds to a class of optimal persuasion policies in which any belief is assigned to each off-path message. Moreover, you could also ...


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I'm not familiar with this area, so I can't tell you what are the seminal works, etc., but a quick search finds Gurley & Johnson (2017) "Viral economics: an epidemiological model of knowledge diffusion in economics": We model the diffusion of economic knowledge using an epidemiological model of susceptible, exposed, infected/inspired, and recovered ...


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The efficient market hypothesis does not require everyone being omniscient. It works through the supply/demand and price mechanism. For example, imagine that you have private information that a company X is doing bad (without being a manager or other person banned from insider trading). If company X is doing bad then sooner or later it’s stock price will ...


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