# Tag Info

### Why would a company sabotage its product's ability to be used for a particular purpose?

Limiting the hash rate is maximizing the demand for their product. Historically, gamers have been crucial to Nvidia's success. Their demands drive innovation, and they're the ones willing to spend ...
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### Why would a company sabotage its product's ability to be used for a particular purpose?

This topic is explained by market segmentation with price discrimination in monopolies. This is widely used in, for example, price discounts for senior/retired people. By targetting different market ...
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### Nash equilibrium of a Bertrand game with different marginal costs

Yes, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. For any price charged by firm 2 above $c_1$, firm one could only best respond by charging the largest price that is strictly smaller. which is ...
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### Why would a company sabotage its product's ability to be used for a particular purpose?

Disclaimer: I am not at all familiar with the hardware industry; in fact I believe this answer makes most of my points but is better tailored for the specific industry in question. Market share A ...
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### How do small firms survive in an oligopoly?

When there are few big firms and many smaller firms with a small market share, economists speak about a market with a competitive fringe. The smaller firms are price takers, have higher marginal and ...
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### Nash equilibrium of a Bertrand game with different marginal costs

It is my impression that this has been formalized under the $\varepsilon$-equilibrium concept ("epsilon-equilibrium"). It is even called "approximate-Nash" equilibrium. Shamelessly copying from the ...
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### A market correction for an industry which has had long-run negative externalities

An aspect of the matter could be described as follows: We want prompt replacement of (existing) fixed capital because, I guess, it creates currently "unacceptable" levels of negative externalities,...
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### Is there any research, theory, or anything which shows how much of a market has to be in power of a few companies to be a force against free market?

The quote in the question isn't really rigorous about what a free market is, but it talks about monopolies and artificial scarcities, so I am interpreting the efficient outcome with price equal to ...
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### Uniform price vs. pay-as-bid auctions in energy markets

I believe "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid" by Pycia and Woodward answers your questions theoretically. This is quite recent and their results are striking. They also ...
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### Profit maximization of an oligopolistic firm

This is Sweezy's (1939) kinked demand curve model. In equilibrium, quantity is at F and price at A. I guess the answer B results from a misconception. The profit maximization equation MR = MC ...
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### Clarification about Market Structure Oligopoly or Monopoly

There is a sense of differentiation thus this is not competitive market clearly. Government regulations in an industry cannot be regarded as a monopoly as government mostly will decide on a price ...
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### Studying Oligopolies

I would recommend taking a look at Jean Tirole's "The Theory of Industrial Organization". This textbook provides a clean exposition of the models of Bertrand, Cournot, Stackelberg, Hotelling, and ...
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### Choosing the nondominant strategy in a duopoly

It seems you interpret the game as a sequential game. If Windward would know that its move was observed by Airtouch it would act as you say. But this is not the case, they move simultaneously, and it ...
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### Nash equilibrium of a Bertrand game with different marginal costs

I think standard in Bertrand competition with different constant marginal cost is another assumption in case of equal prices. Instead of sharing demand equally, you could assume that in case of equal ...
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### 3 Firm Stackelberg's Oligopoly Game

I assume that you found Firm 3's best response to be $$q_3^*(q_1,q_2)=\frac12(16-q_1-q_2).$$ The next step would be to solve for Firm 2's best response. Since Firm 2 ...
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### Finding the demand function

I don't have a question to "correctly interpret" , but I think the way you are calculating the demand function is correct. The demand curve in an oligopoly can be kinked (bowed out), as this one is. I ...
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### Question on oligopoly.

You have solved the Cournot part correctly, but then you've gone completely off the road, by mistaking economics for mathematics. This usually happens. First of all, you shouldn't assume just any ...
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