# Tag Info

24

Voluntarily contributing to a public good (such as Wikipedia) is a strong social norm. The tendency to follow such norms even if this is costly in the short run has developed over humans' evolutionary history, as in small to medium-sized hunter-gatherer communities this behavior was adaptive, e.g. due to reputation effects ("community enforcement")....

24

I wouldn't underestimate the role of learning by answering. Drafting a significant text typically forces a person to put their thoughts in order, to engage in research, and then to structure the information for the purpose of recording and conveying it. It is not unusual that further insights or questions emerge during this process, the answerer certainly ...

14

tl;dr: There could be multiple explanations depending on how you want to treat Wikipedia. If you want to treat Wikipedia as public good where everyone contributes a small part towards its creation and that everyone then enjoys equality you can explain it as people trying to still satisfy their own preferences through consuming the final Wikipedia page. You ...

8

Look at the data For starters, the obvious thing is to look at the data about the self-reported reasons for contributing to wikipedia (and I'm surprised that neither the question asker nor most of the answers have done so). For example, Wikipedia itself has a section on the motivation that refers to multiple studies - though many of them are behind a paywall ...

6

Let's first determine the sets of actions of the players. An action of player 1 is simply a bid $x_1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$. An action of player 2 is a function: $f_2: \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ that determines for every action $x_1$ of Player $1$ an action $x_2 = f_2(x_1) \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Let us denote by $F_2$ the set of all actions of player 2. Let's now ...

6

You are only required to get Nash equilibria and not sequentially rational/subgame perfect equilibria. Hence Player 2's actions at information sets that do not occur (that do not reflect Player 1's actual strategy) do not need to be best responses. All you have to make sure is that no one is better off by deviating. In case 4., regardless of what Player 2 ...

5

The following is essentialy due to Debreu. The result is formulated in terms of linear orders, but each complete and transitive relation induces a linear order on the indifference classes: Theorem: Let $S$ be a set and $\preceq$ be a linear order on $S$. Then $\preceq$ has a utility representation if and only if there exists a countable set $C\subseteq S$ ...

5

As pointed in the comments this was done by Ragnar Frisch. At least Barten and Böhm. (1982) as well as Johansen (1969) attribute these axioms to one of these two publications: Frisch, Ragnar (1926). "Sur un problème d'économie pure [On a problem in pure economics]". Norsk Matematisk Forenings Skrifter, Oslo. 1 (16): 1–40 Frisch,(1926). "...

4

There is a problem in how you translate completeness into behavior. Let $R$ be any binary relation, representing preferences, on a set $X$ of alternatives and $A\subseteq X$ be a nonempty set of alternatives available. The usual assumption is that the decisionmaker chooses an alternative $a\in A$ optimally according to the relation $R$. Here are three ways ...

3

The true answer is of course it depends. What it depends on is how you define sustainability. In a natural resources context, with weak sustainability, soil quality is a capital asset, just as a fish stock, a forest or an oil field. Given that we have manure and fertilizer I would argue that it is a renewable resource (until we run out of phosphate perhaps ...

2

There are several problems with your game that you are not considering, the first of which is that the risk of ruin is irrelevant. The game is a race. Your question is roughly equivalent to concerning yourself with your horse falling and dying in the race but with an objective to win the race. The death of the horse is not the only way to lose. Ruin is ...

2

Indifference is different from incompleteness. A good example is indecisiveness. Eliaz and Ok have a nice discussion. Suppose you want to buy holidays for your family. You know your wife prefers Bahamas to Florida to Paris. Since you do not care particularly about the destination, you choose trying to represent their preferences. If Bahamas and Florida are ...

2

I think that you should proceed by contradiction assume D is continuous, but $\succsim$ is not, then for a bundle either the more preferred than or the less preferred than sets are not closed. Choose the problematic set and choose a set B appropriately to get a contradiction of the existence of a maximum (remember that not closed sets might not admit a ...

2

In 2-player games, the strategies that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies are called rationalizable. Note that even if no strategy is strictly dominant, there can be strictly dominated strategies. If you cannot eliminate any strategy, then all strategies are rationalizable. Only if correlation of players' randomization is allowed, ...

1

The efficient market hypothesis does not require everyone being omniscient. It works through the supply/demand and price mechanism. For example, imagine that you have private information that a company X is doing bad (without being a manager or other person banned from insider trading). If company X is doing bad then sooner or later it’s stock price will ...

1

In microeconomics people are rational if they act to maximize their utility function. What goes into the utility function? Anything that is relevant when they choose, which is of course up to debate. Often economists are content to accept a first order approximation of what matters and should therefore be included in the utility function, namely monetary ...

1

(Bottom in bold is a partial TL;DR) The definition your book gives you only seems incoherent because you take "people act to make themselves better off" (your book's definition) as the same as (or similar enough to) "fulfills their desire for happiness" (your characterization or additional characterization in the question you presented). ...

1

After all,suppose person A knows they will derive satisfaction from honoring sunk costs. Then doesn't honoring sunk costs make them better off (it fulfills their desire for happiness), and therefore becomes rational for person A? Utility experienced from honouring sunk costs is treated separately from honouring sunk costs themselves. ( section 2 of http://...

1

I assume you are talking about preferences? In case you are talking about mathematical relations in general, $\geq$ in $\mathbb{R}^2$ is not complete, as neither $(0,1) \geq (1,0)$ nor the opposite holds. In case you are talking about preferences or decision theory, I don't think you can come up with any examples that violate completeness. The issue is ...

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