# Tag Info

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Voluntarily contributing to a public good (such as Wikipedia) is a strong social norm. The tendency to follow such norms even if this is costly in the short run has developed over humans' evolutionary history, as in small to medium-sized hunter-gatherer communities this behavior was adaptive, e.g. due to reputation effects ("community enforcement")....

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I wouldn't underestimate the role of learning by answering. Drafting a significant text typically forces a person to put their thoughts in order, to engage in research, and then to structure the information for the purpose of recording and conveying it. It is not unusual that further insights or questions emerge during this process, the answerer certainly ...

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tl;dr: There could be multiple explanations depending on how you want to treat Wikipedia. If you want to treat Wikipedia as public good where everyone contributes a small part towards its creation and that everyone then enjoys equality you can explain it as people trying to still satisfy their own preferences through consuming the final Wikipedia page. You ...

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Look at the data For starters, the obvious thing is to look at the data about the self-reported reasons for contributing to wikipedia (and I'm surprised that neither the question asker nor most of the answers have done so). For example, Wikipedia itself has a section on the motivation that refers to multiple studies - though many of them are behind a paywall ...

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Let's first determine the sets of actions of the players. An action of player 1 is simply a bid $x_1 \in \mathbb{R}_+$. An action of player 2 is a function: $f_2: \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$ that determines for every action $x_1$ of Player $1$ an action $x_2 = f_2(x_1) \in \mathbb{R}_+$. Let us denote by $F_2$ the set of all actions of player 2. Let's now ...

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You are only required to get Nash equilibria and not sequentially rational/subgame perfect equilibria. Hence Player 2's actions at information sets that do not occur (that do not reflect Player 1's actual strategy) do not need to be best responses. All you have to make sure is that no one is better off by deviating. In case 4., regardless of what Player 2 ...

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As pointed in the comments this was done by Ragnar Frisch. At least Barten and Böhm. (1982) as well as Johansen (1969) attribute these axioms to one of these two publications: Frisch, Ragnar (1926). "Sur un problème d'économie pure [On a problem in pure economics]". Norsk Matematisk Forenings Skrifter, Oslo. 1 (16): 1–40 Frisch,(1926). "...

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The following is essentialy due to Debreu. The result is formulated in terms of linear orders, but each complete and transitive relation induces a linear order on the indifference classes: Theorem: Let $S$ be a set and $\preceq$ be a linear order on $S$. Then $\preceq$ has a utility representation if and only if there exists a countable set $C\subseteq S$ ...

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In 2-player games, the strategies that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies are called rationalizable. Note that even if no strategy is strictly dominant, there can be strictly dominated strategies. If you cannot eliminate any strategy, then all strategies are rationalizable. Only if correlation of players' randomization is allowed, ...

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