# Tag Info

Accepted

### Finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma without sub-game perfection

There is also no NE which sustains coopration for more or less the same reason as in the SPNE case. Consider, a PD played twice. A strategy contains five actions, one for each decision node: one in ...
• 5,291
Accepted

### Finitely repeated Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma with switching cost

A couple hints. Regarding the lower bound on $\epsilon$: What happens if deviation occurs at stage $T$? In other words, there is no opportunity for your so-called "punishment stages". ...
• 15.5k
Accepted

### Game theory with rational and irrational players

Yes, a whole book has been written on Behavioral Game Theory. More specifically, standard solution concept such as Nash equilibrium requires that players best respond to a correct belief about other ...
• 15.5k
Accepted

### Slight Uncertainty of Continuation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Imagine you have played the first 19 rounds. Now a chance event decides on whether there will be another, final, round. What's your optimal action in this last round, in case it actually occurs? ...
• 6,994

### Infinitely repeated game with stationary and symmetric equilibrium

Why don't you attack the problem straighrforwardly and investigate the profitability of a deviation? Suppose there was a Nash equilibrium in which both players decide to stay forever. Both players ...
• 5,291
Accepted

### Clarification of iterated prisoners dilemma

The payoff depends entirely on how you set the game up. Here's one example of the case where $2R \leq T + S$: ...
• 2,792

### Why is the tat-for-tat strategy a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games?

(i) In the 1 round case, tit-for-tat is not a NE. To see this notice that the tit-for-tat strategy, as you describe, dictates that the players play $(H,H)$ in the first (and only) round---as you point ...
• 956

### Payoffs in an infinitely-repeated game with discounting

I am going to construct pure strategies, taking average payoffs so far as a state variable, that achieve the payoffs $(4,4)$ in the infinitely repeated game. Call the row player's actions $T$, $M$, ...

### Payoffs in an infinitely-repeated game with discounting

Disclaimer: I only have a slight clue about repeated games and I have virtually no clue about coding (except the compulsory stuff I had to do in grad school). That being said, consider this stream of ...
• 5,291
Accepted

### Nash Equilibrium of modified Keynes' beauty contest

Assume the players have to choose integers, otherwise a best response may not exist. Let the payoff of winning be $\alpha\cdot[\frac23\text{ of the average}]$, $\alpha>0$. Consider the two player (...
• 15.5k
Accepted

### Penance strategy game theory

I see two ways to produce histories with multi-state deviations (not including the degenerate case in which all states defect): Multiple states defect in different periods. This possibility is ruled ...
• 1,806
Accepted

### Simultaneous vs Sequential Games

In the standard theory of games, simultaneous and sequential games are distinguished by the means of something called "Information Sets". Alluding to the origins of Game Theory (von Neumann ...
• 308
1 vote
Accepted

### How does this reporting correspondence is redefined?

Without this being a clear answer onge thought could be to define the reporting correspondence as it follows R_i^t(s_i^t|h^{t-1})=\{s_i^t\in S_i^t\quad \text{where player $i$ reports truthfully her ...
• 959
1 vote

### How to show that a strategy is a SPNE in repeated games

For the first part: correct, any NE in the stage game is a SPNE in an repeated game. In fact, it is the only SPNE if the game is repeated finitely many times. For the second part: to check that a ...
1 vote

• 5,291
1 vote

### Nash Equilibrium of modified Keynes' beauty contest

@denesp nailed the answer on the head. This is not different from the original game in any meaningful way, therefore, the nash equilibrium remains the same. Size of payouts don't change the outcome ...
• 661

Only top scored, non community-wiki answers of a minimum length are eligible