Erel Segal-Halevi
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16 answers
113 votes
20k views
How will non-rich citizens make a living if jobs keep getting replaced by robots and are outsourced?
7 votes

In Progress and Poverty, Henry George claims that the advancement of technology eventually leads to increasing the land value and the land rent. This means that people who own land will have a high ...

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5 answers
16 votes
4k views
Topological concepts in economic theory
5 votes

Measure theory is widely used in the problem of fair division (aka "cake-cutting"). See the many papers about fairness in economics journals. For a particular example, see Tatsuro Ichiishi and Adam ...

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2 answers
12 votes
287 views
Economics of forgetting
4 votes

This topic has been studied widely in the theory of repeated games. See for example: Robert J. Aumann, Sylvain Sorin: Cooperation and bounded recall, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 1, No. 1. (...

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5 answers
14 votes
1k views
Are there Utility Monsters in Economics?
4 votes

There is a quantification of this "utility monstrousness" in the fair division model. In that model, a resource has to be divided among $n$ partners, all of whom have the same rights to that resource ...

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1 answers
1 votes
807 views
Question on Pareto optimality problem
2 votes

As denesp mentioned, your solution is incorrect. To check whether there is envy, you have to compare the two bundles from the point of view of the same agent. So in our case we have: For agent A: the ...

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4 answers
8 votes
484 views
Fair and efficient allocation of "family goods"
1 votes

Suppose the preferences of all agents in all families are monotone and convex (the standard assumptions of consumer theory). Then, a Pareto-efficient envy-free allocation always exists when there ...

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1 answers
1 votes
215 views
Approximating the socially-optimal price in a monopolist market
1 votes

The following paper apparently deals with a very similar question: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs In Ecnometrica (1982), pp. 911-930, doi:10.2307/1912769 by P. Baron, Roger B. ...

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1 answers
1 votes
45 views
Repeatedly playing an equilibrium in a repeated game
Accepted answer
1 votes

Suppose all players play unconditioned Nash equilibria, except player $i$ who diverts and plays another strategy. The other strategy of player $i$ may depend on history. We have to show that player $i$...

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