Let $X$ be the closed compact convex set of alternative and $B$ be a closed compact convex subset of $X$. $C$ is defined on all closed compact convex set $B\subseteq X$.
$X$ is ordered by a strictly convex preference (not necessarily continuous).
$C$ is a well-defined choice function choosing the maximal element from $B$. Function $C:2^B\to B$. If follows that $C(B)$ is unique for each $B$
Define $xPy$ if $x=C(B)$ and $y\in B$. If $xPy$ and $yPz$ , we say $xP'z$.
$P$ is the direct revealed preference relation. $P'$ is the indirect one?
Can we say $P'$ is complete, in a sense that if $x\succ y$ then $xP'y$? This means any pair of $x,y$ can be ranked by the indirect revealed preference.
To prove that $xP'y$, we need to find a finite sequence that $z_1,z_2...z_n$ such that $xPz_1P...Pz_nPy$.
If you draw two indifference curve, and choose one point from each, you can see that it is usually not the case the $xPy$, but usually you can draw a new IC in between, find a $z$, to make $xPzPy$.
Side-Note that in classic RP theory, the data set is usually finite, and therefore $P'$ cannot be complete. Here $C$ is a function so completeness might be possible.
Strong Axiom of revealed preference: $xP' z$ and $x\neq z$ implies $z\not P' x$. SARP implies the existence of $u$ such that $x=\arg\max_{x\in B}u(x)$. It seems to me that SARP is not enough as it is possible that $x\sim y$ and then $x\not P'y$ and $y\not P'x$.