Skip to main content

All Questions

Filter by
Sorted by
Tagged with
2 votes
1 answer
265 views

Spence-Mirrlees Single Crossing Condition

This question stems from section 2.3.3.1, pages 76-78 of Bolton and Dewatripont "Contract Theory". Suppose we have a single buyer and supplier. Buyers types are drawn from a continuum $\...
Joseph Basford's user avatar
3 votes
0 answers
36 views

Screening models with multiple goods and interacting costs

I'm looking for a reference in the literature on monopolistic screening/mechanism design, where there are multiple allocative variables and these interact in the agent's utility function. For example, ...
econ1324's user avatar
5 votes
1 answer
125 views

Payoff from an option contract

In period 1 the consumer of type $\theta$ selects an option contract consisting of an up-front fee, $B>0$, and exercise price, $\bar{R}$. The consumer pays $B$ at the end of the first period. In ...
Charles's user avatar
  • 301
1 vote
0 answers
115 views

A manifold of agents?

In contract theory and mechanism design, if the agents have one-dimensional characteristics, then they are usually considered as a contiuum on $\mathbb R$; if they have n-dimensional type, then they ...
High GPA's user avatar
  • 2,084
14 votes
3 answers
36k views

What is the definition of "First Best", "Second Best", etc. in contract theory?

What is the definition of "First Best", "Second Best", etc. in contract theory? Especially, what is the difference between "First Best" in contract theory and "ex-post efficient" in mechanism design?
Joe Li's user avatar
  • 243